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The study of terrorism has gained attention and prominence post-September 11, 
2001.  Much of the literature on terrorism is teleological, and many authors focus their 
research on America’s involvement with terrorism in the Middle East beginning with the 
Iran hostage crisis in 1979.  Accordingly, the literature fails to highlight the rise of 
terrorism in the Middle East and the importance of the Middle East to American foreign 
policy during the Nixon Administration.  This study looks at how the American media 
and the American government conceptualized terrorism during the Nixon Administration, 
from 1969 to 1974.  An analysis of American print media sources demonstrates that 
terrorism was associated with the Middle East more than other regions in the later years 
of Nixon’s presidency.  American government documents reveal that the government 
linked terrorism with the Middle East after a fundamental shift in the perception of 
terrorism took place after the Munich Olympics massacre in 1972.  In order to understand 
the contemporary manifestation of terrorism in American life, it is imperative to 



































First, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Andrew Hunt, for his continuous 
guidance.  He always provided feedback that made me want to explore topics further.  He 
listened to my ideas and provided valuable advice that greatly strengthened my work.  
Thank you for your patience and support.  I am also grateful for Dr. Whitney 
Lackenbauer’s constant encouragement and enthusiasm.  Dr. Lackenbauer challenged me 
to look beyond obvious conclusions, to expand my knowledge, and to continually grow 
within the discipline of history.  His support as an advisory committee member for this 
thesis is greatly appreciated.  Thank you for always believing in my abilities and 
reminding me of my potential.  I also thank Dr. Gary Bruce for his contributions as a 
member of my advisory committee.   His passion for his studies inspires me.  Thank you 
for your insight and your kind words. 
   I thank the many professors who helped me throughout this journey.  Thank you 
Dr. Carl Bon Tempo for introducing me to the Foreign Relations of the United States 
documents pertaining to terrorism during the Nixon Administration.  I value your 
direction in the early stages of this topic and your continued support.  Thank you Dr. 
Tracy Penny Light for your words of confidence and your guidance.    
I would like to say ‘thank you’ to my friends and family.  My graduate experience 
would not be the same without the wonderful group of scholars with whom I was able to 
share it.  Thank you all for challenging me along the way, and for your friendship.  I am 
glad we could take on this adventure together.  Thank you Lindsay Nelson for your 
excitement about my work and for your loving words.  Thank you Kelley Teahen for 
your patience and your interest in my work.  Your guidance is greatly appreciated. 
A special thanks is dedicated to my best friend and partner Kyle Nash.  His 
calming words and his ability to help me see the larger picture helped me in ways he may 
never know.  Thank you for believing in me and for your endless support.  I would like to 
thank my brother, Jonathan Teahen, for his ability to make me laugh even when times get 
tough.  Thank you Holly Teahen, my mother and one of my biggest supporters.  For her 
unending belief in my abilities, and her compassion, I am forever grateful.  Finally, I 
would like to thank my father, David Teahen.  His patience, attention to detail, and 
perseverance helped me make this work something I am very proud of.   
  











Table of Contents 
 
Introduction 1 
Chapter 1:                                                                                                                  
Publicizing an ‘International Disease’: Terrorism in the Media from 1969-1974 10 
Vietnam 17 
Ireland 20 
South Africa 23 
Canada 27 
Latin America  32 
The Middle East 35 
The United States of America 42 
Conclusion 49  
Chapter 2:                                                                                                                              
‘Dealing with the Scourge of Terrorism’: How the American Government 
Conceptualized Terrorism between 1969 and 1974 53 
1969: Inconvenient Detours 60 
1970: The Annoying Little Gnat to be Squashed 63 
1971: U.S. Entanglements with the Middle East 68 
1972: International Terrorism at the Olympics 70 
1973: The Threat of Middle East Terrorism Hardens 77 
1974: Another ‘Guerrilla Action,’ Another Challenge to All Decent Human Instinct 80 
Conclusion 84 
Chapter 3:                                                                                                                                
‘A Tragedy for All the Peoples and Nations of the World’: The Munich Olympic 
Massacre 88 
Munich in the Media 102 
The American Government and Munich 109 
















Shortly after midnight on June 5, 1968, Robert F. Kennedy addressed a crowd in 
the main ballroom of the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles.  The 43-year-old senator 
from New York had just won the California primary in his campaign for the Presidential 
nomination of the Democratic Party.  Kennedy expressed his thanks to his supporters, his 
campaign team, his wife Ethel, and in good humour he thanked his dog, Freckles. To the 
applause of the audience he announced: “And now on to Chicago and let’s win there.”  
With several final waves, Kennedy left the podium and a number of people escorted him 
through the food service pantry to avoid the crowded ballroom.  While making his way 
through the area, a man stepped forward and approached Kennedy, shooting him three 
times.  Five others were shot, but not fatally, in the commotion.  The gunman was 
disarmed and arrested at the scene.  Kennedy was taken to hospital and died early the 
next morning of a head wound. 
Kennedy’s assassin was 24-year-old Sirhan Sirhan, a Palestinian born in 
Jerusalem to Christian parents.  His family moved to the U.S. when Sirhan was young, 
and he lived in California at the time of the shooting.  Sirhan killed Kennedy because 
Kennedy supported Israel in the Six Day War, which began exactly a year before the 
assassination.  Sirhan was convicted of first-degree murder in 1969 and was sentenced to 
death in the gas chamber; however, in 1972 his sentence was changed to life 
imprisonment when the state of California invalidated all death sentences imposed prior 
to 1972.  He is currently held in California State Prison after repeatedly being denied 
parole. 
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After Kennedy’s assassination, Americans were so focused on grieving and 
remembering his achievements that they hardly noticed that Sirhan was a fanatical 
Palestinian.  Surprisingly, Sirhan’s nationality was not a big issue in 1968, nor was 
Kennedy’s murder considered as an act of terrorism.  This is very telling of the 
nationwide state of thinking at that time.  The 1960s were a complex era of cultural, 
social, and political change for Americans.  The Civil Rights Act of 1964 outlawed 
segregation of African Americans in schools, public places and employment; the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union came to the brink of a nuclear confrontation in 1962; the Sino-
Soviet split threatened Cold War alliances; American youths rebelled against society’s 
conservative norms and the new left, in support of a counterculture, emerged; the U.S. 
entered the war in Vietnam; and Betty Friedan’s book The Feminine Mystique, published 
in 1963, ignited the women’s movement.  However, by 1968, much of the optimism for 
hope and change during the 1960s began to fade.  Due to America’s increased 
involvement in Vietnam, tens of thousands of young men were sent home in body bags.  
In April 1968, the leader of the civil rights movement, Martin Luther King Jr., was 
assassinated.  Many Americans became disenchanted with society’s ills and foreign 
entanglements in the name of ideological supremacy.  Protest movements that were once 
peaceful turned violent in the face of such despair.  Therefore, when President Richard 
Nixon was inaugurated on January 20, 1969, his immediate concerns included Vietnam, 
the Soviet Union, China, and domestic unrest. 
The assassination of a presidential hopeful by a Palestinian did not register as 
terrorism in 1968.  But what was considered terrorism at this time?  From 1969 to 1974 
terrorism was widespread in nations around the world, but how did the American media 
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and the U.S. government conceptualize terrorism in that era?  Men and women hijacked 
planes, kidnapped diplomats, bombed government landmarks and civilian spaces, and 
assassinated individuals for a number of different political motives, but were all of these 
acts considered terrorism?  The turbulent times of the 1960s spilled over to violent 
protests in the U.S. against American involvement in Vietnam in the early 1970s.  Along 
with domestic unrest, violence erupted in many other regions, including Latin America, 
the Middle East, Ireland, Vietnam, Canada, and Africa.  What did the media and the 
government classify as terrorism in each region?  And in their view, what regions posed 
the greatest concerns to international security?  It is important to note that in the late 
1960s and early 1970s, terrorism was not defined and categorized the way we are familiar 
with the phenomenon today. Therefore, it is up to the historian to view terrorism in its 
context during the Nixon Administration to acknowledge that things were very different 
in the early 1970s.  
The study of terrorism has achieved new attention and prominence post-
September 11, 2001.  The popularity of literature on terrorism and the U.S. coincides 
with the American public’s attempt to deal with the reality of terrorism in the American 
heartland.  Yet scholars have been captivated by the topic since the 1980s.  Although 
much of the literature is teleological and reactionary, some scholars have infused their 
work with historical content to understand the roots of terrorism in order to analyze its 
contemporary manifestation.  Several authors, including David Farber and Mark Bowden, 
begin their story on American counter-terror in the 1980s with Reagan’s declaration of 
America’s “War on Terror” after the conclusion of the Iranian hostage crisis.  Yet, this 
approach largely ignores the impact of terrorist acts in the early 1970s.  Renowned 
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terrorism and insurgency expert, Bruce Hoffman, attributes the internationalization of 
terrorism in the late 1960s and early 1970s to the unprecedented prosperity at the time 
that allowed the luxury of introspection and self-criticism.  In Inside Terrorism he points 
to the sharp contrast between the highest and lowest domestic levels of wealth and 
consumption that was accentuated by the growing disparity between the developed and 
underdeveloped world.  During this time, youthful optimism and social dissatisfaction 
altered the perception of affluent countries.  In Terrorism’s War With America: A 
History, Denis Piszkiewicz acknowledges that the tragic events of 9/11 began the U.S.’s 
“War on Terror,” but he believes terrorism’s war on America began four decades earlier.  
According to him, although American leaders occasionally spoke of the threat of 
international terrorism, they failed to implement effective programs to protect the U.S. 
when it became vulnerable in the 1970s due to its support for Israel.  He focuses on the 
U.S. as the victim of terrorism, rather than the country’s general reaction to terrorism at 
home and abroad.    
Historian Robert Kumamoto specifically studies terrorism in three regions: 
Palestine, Algeria and the Middle East in International Terrorism and American Foreign 
Relations 1945-1976.  Kumamtoto explores the internationalization of terrorism in the 
early 1970s and he highlights the terrorist acts that affected the three regions he focuses 
on.  He looks at the debates in the UN after the attack at the Munich Olympics in 1972, 
but to him, the terrorist group responsible, Black September, simply added another new 
and terrifying group to the Palestinian nationalist movement.  Timothy Naftali focuses on 
the history of American counter-terror with Blind Spot: The Secret History of American 
Counterterrorism.  Naftali is a historian and the director of the Richard Nixon 
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Presidential Library and Museum.  In Blind Spot he concentrates on how America tried to 
define terrorism over time; for example, in the late 1960s the term “international 
terrorism” did not yet appear in the national consciousness.  According to Naftali, this 
concept of terrorism changed in the 1970s when Palestinian hijackers transformed 
hijacking into a terrifying political act that played out on the world stage.  Throughout the 
book Naftali explains that the American public was rarely on the same page as 
policymakers dealing with counter-terrorism.  This demonstrates that terrorism affected 
different people in different ways, and thus Americans’ understanding of terrorism was 
constantly changing.  Overall, Naftali addresses the danger terrorism posed in the 1970s, 
but he insists it remained secondary to other foreign policy endeavours carried out by the 
Nixon Administration.  
All of the authors mentioned above address America’s perception of terrorism in 
the early 1970s, but very briefly.  The works combine to produce fruitful scholarship on 
the history of terrorism, but they leave an opening for further examination of the various 
perpetrators, victims, and eras mentioned.  The scholarship does not explain how the 
American government or the media conceptualized terrorism during the Nixon 
Administration.  Naftali addresses the rhetoric of upper-echelon government officials, but 
he does not give a holistic view of the regions and terrorist acts that shaped America’s 
perception in the early 1970s.   For many authors this era is dedicated only a chapter at 
most; therefore they come up short of examining the changing trends associated with 
terrorism during Nixon’s presidency.  For example, they fail to analyze the rise of 
terrorism in the Middle East combined with Nixon’s foreign policy priorities in that area. 
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While there is ample literature on America and terrorism and much has been 
written on Nixon’s foreign policy in the Middle East, rarely are the two discussed in 
combination.  The literature on Nixon’s foreign policy stresses that the Middle East was a 
major concern because the region became entwined with Cold War politics.  The works 
on terrorism address the violence in the Middle East, but they misjudge the severity of the 
threat of terrorism from the Middle East combined with the foreign policy entanglements 
in the region.  The scholarship on Nixon’s foreign policy examines the urgency with 
which Nixon addressed the Middle East.  Written at the end of the Cold War, George 
Lenczowski’s chapter “The Nixon Presidency” in American Presidents and the Middle 
East emphasizes Nixon’s obsession with a possible American-Soviet confrontation in the 
Middle East.  Lenczowski observes that nowhere in Nixon’s writings or public statements 
did he analyze the idea of a likely confrontation with Russia on account of the Arab-
Israeli conflict; rather he seemed to accept that confrontation with the Soviet Union was 
inevitable in the case of an Arab-Israel war.  
In Nixon Reconsidered, author Joan Hoff explains that Nixon waited too long to 
focus systematically on the problems in the Middle East.  Only in 1973 when he wanted 
to declare the year the “Year of the Middle East”, did he include the region as one of his 
diplomatic fronts.  According to Hoff, when Nixon assumed office in 1968 he was 
convinced that the key to peace in the Middle East lay as much with the Soviet Union as 
it did in Syria or Egypt.  William Bundy’s A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy 
in the Nixon Presidency views Nixon’s policies in the Middle East as effective overall, 
especially after the October 1973 War.  Bundy, a former member of the CIA and a 
foreign affairs advisor to John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson reminds his readers that 
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a lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours had been a U.S. objective since 
the creation of Israel in 1948.  According to Bundy, the Nixon Administration inherited a 
stalemated and dangerous situation in the Middle East, but left an ongoing peace process 
to his successors.  From the beginning of his discussion on the Middle East in Nixon and 
Kissinger: Partners in Power, author Robert Dallek includes the region among Nixon’s 
major challenges.  Throughout the book, Dallek emphasizes the importance of the 
daunting problem in the Middle East that only increased in intensity during Nixon’s 
presidency.  Furthermore, he views finding solutions to the Arab-Israeli problem to be as 
great a challenge as constructing a graceful exit from Vietnam.   Dallek explains that the 
Nixon Administration saw no way to impose a settlement on warring parties in the 
Middle East, but at the same time they understood that the U.S. could not publically 
ignore the problems in the region.  At the same time, Dallek acknowledges that Nixon 
was determined not to allow the Soviet Union to make gains in the Middle East. 
The authors discussed above all highlight the Middle East as an important fixture 
in Nixon’s foreign policy.  They acknowledge the complications Nixon faced in the 
region during the depths of the Cold War, when leaders had to move carefully and 
efficiently within the power structures that affected remote countries and conflicted 
nations.  The Cold War had its opposing superpowers, but at least they played by the 
rules.  Conversely, the Middle East posed a complex and dangerous situation that pitted 
individual countries and factions against one another.  This complicated situation was 
coupled with terrorism in the region, yet the authors fail to make even sweeping 
connections between the two.  This presents a second conceptual gap in the literature.  
Authors writing about terrorism highlight the rise of terrorism in the Middle East and 
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authors writing on Nixon’s foreign policy emphasize the importance of the Middle East 
to international security, yet neither group of authors study the two together.   
In the following analysis I use American print media sources and government 
documents to evaluate how both the media and the U.S. government conceptualized 
terrorism during the Nixon Administration.  In the first chapter, I look at the rhetoric used 
in media samples to explain how terrorism was perceived in several geographic regions.  
I focus on where terrorism activity took place, who were considered terrorists, and what 
acts were classified as terrorism.  The study shows that in media reporting, terrorism was 
not more or less associated with the Middle East than other parts of the world until the 
later years of Nixon’s presidency, from 1972-1974.  In the second chapter, I examine 
how terrorism was referred to in government documents, including the language used to 
define terrorists and terrorist acts.  The chapter is divided chronologically and it is 
evident that after the attack at the Munich Olympics in September 1972, there was a 
fundamental shift in the American government’s perception of terrorism.  The third and 
final chapter is a case study of the attack at Munich that combines both media and 
government sources to demonstrate that Munich was a turning point in America’s shifting 
perception of terrorism.  The media spectacle that surrounded the event and the 
government outrage in the wake of the attack illustrate that after Munich, terrorism in the 
Middle East became a threat to international security.  
The perception of terrorism post-Munich is very different than the beginning of 
Nixon’s presidency when the U.S. largely viewed terrorism as criminal behaviour and a 
nuisance that was not linked to any one region.  Sirhan Sirhan’s nationality was not a 
major concern when he assassinated Kennedy in 1968 because Americans were 
  9 
preoccupied with ailments other than terrorism, and the Middle East seemed very far 
from the American consciousness.  This changed as the frequency of terrorist attacks and 
the threat they posed to the international community increased during Nixon’s 
presidency.  Now we may perceive that the Robert Kennedy assassination was a 
significant episode in the continuum of terrorist acts over the past forty plus years. 
At the beginning of Nixon’s presidency, terrorism was linked to a number of 
different factors, including national liberation.  Buzz phrases like “political terrorism” 
and “international terrorism” emerged in this era.  However the term “terrorism” was not 
fully integrated into the American rhetoric, nor was it defined in stark terms as we are 
familiar with it today.  Still, government officials and the American public pay little 
attention to America’s awareness of terrorism during the Nixon administration.  What 
Americans knew about terrorism before 9/11 was shaped by their previous experiences 
with terrorism post-1979 Iran, and the images and stories that became part of American 
culture in the 1980s.  However, understanding America’s encounters with terrorism in the 
early 1970s and the perceptions of terrorism at time are essential in order to better 

















Publicizing an ‘International Disease’: Terrorism in the Media from 1969-1974 
 
 Shortly after daylight on May 12, 1969, three bombs exploded in the central 
market area of Saigon, South Vietnam. 1  One of the blasts heavily damaged a pedestrian 
overpass, killing one man and wounding six others.  Nearby a child was wounded as two 
other explosions went off at a gas station.  On March 6, 1970, five armed men from the 
Rebel Armed Forces in Guatemala kidnapped Sean Holly, a political secretary in the 
United States Embassy.  The members of the extreme left-wing guerrilla organization 
forced Holly’s car to the curb at a main street and forced the diplomat into one of their 
cars and drove off.2  In protest against the Army Mathematics Research Center and the 
Vietnam War, Sterling Hall at the University of Wisconsin-Madison was bombed on 
August 24, 1970, killing one man and destroying the research of several others.3  Early 
Sunday, October 17, 1970, Pierre Laporte, Quebec Minister of Labour and Immigration, 
was found strangled to death in the trunk of a car after the Front de libération du Québec, 
an organization of young French Canadians dedicated to Quebec separatism, kidnapped 
him earlier that week.4  On February 19, 1971, police in Johannesburg, South Africa 
arrested about 20 people (including teachers, lawyers and businessmen who were 
members of either the Unity Movement or the African Peoples Democratic Union of 
South Africa, neither of which were banned by the government) in raids throughout 
                                                        
1 “Shellings, Terrorism: War Heating Up,” Los Angeles Times, May 12, 1969, 1. 
2 Juan de Onis, “5 Guatemalans Kidnap U.S. Aid”, New York Times, Mar 7, 1970, 1 
3 Trudy Rubin, “Wisconsin Quandary: University vs. Terrorism,” The Christian Science Monitor, Oct 5, 
1970, 1. 
4 Edward Cowan, “Laporte Funeral Held Under Guard,” New York Times, Oct 21, 1970, 1. 
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South Africa under the provisions of the Terrorism Act.5  At midnight on July 12, 1971, 
large groups of bombers attacked several prominent shops along Belfast’s main street as 
Protestants were celebrating the anniversary of the triumph of Protestant William II of 
Orange over Roman Catholic James II.6  During the 1972 Olympic Games held in 
Munich, Germany, eight young Palestinians from the Black September group invaded the 
Olympic Village and seized nine Israeli athletes as hostages and killed two others in the 
early morning hours of September 5, 1972.7  Later that night all of the Israeli Olympians 
who were held hostage were killed at an airport on the outskirts of Munich.  And in 
October, 1973, a south-side Chicago mother suffered repeated attacks from a youth gang 
threatening her after she agreed to testify against two of the teenagers on attempted 
robbery, and assault and battery charges.8 
 During the American presidency of Richard Nixon (January 20, 1969 to August 9, 
1974) terrorism was a growing problem in countries all over the globe.  Violent terrorist 
actions took many different forms, which beg several questions: What was considered 
terrorism?  Who were considered terrorists?  What was the difference between political 
violence, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism?  What nations were responsible for 
perpetuating terrorism?  These questions were as prominent and puzzling in the early 
1970s as they are today.  Although these questions tend to stunt any conclusive study 
differentiating and defining terrorist acts, they are important to analyzing terrorism in an 
historical context.  In order to contextualize the various regions, forms, and perpetrators 
of terrorism, the media implicitly address these questions.  As terror attacks became more 
                                                        
5 “20 Seized in South Africa Under the Terrorism Act,” New York Times, Feb 20, 1971, 4. 
6 Robert Nelson, “Escalating Terrorism Perils Ulster,” The Christian Science Monitor, Jul 13, 1971, 1. 
7 “Horror and Death at the Olympics,” TIME, Sep 18, 1972, 22. 
8 “Gang Threats Terrify Witness,” Chicago Defender, Oct 13, 1973, 1. 
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prominent, so did their importance in American news media.  To understand terrorism in 
the early 1970s, one must understand how the media conceptualized terrorism. 
The relationship between terrorism and the media has been extensively studied, 
especially in the post-September 11, 2001 era, by political scientists, sociologists, 
communications experts, journalists, and media specialists. While the authors writing on 
terrorism and the media conclude how the two play off one another, while referencing 
media bias and the use of the media to promote terrorist causes, they fail to historically 
analyze how the media conceptualized the issue at a particular time.  The authors come 
up short of determining whether the media contributed to an overall statement on 
terrorism in the early 1970s, or whether the media was influenced by the political tension 
itself.  Several of the authors present case studies, namely on the Gulf War or the War on 
Terror, which empirically track the use of media and discuss the issues behind freedom of 
the press, rather than contextualize what is written and scrutinize how the media defined 
and classified terrorism.  This may well be beyond the scope of their research, but it 
presents a torch that must be carried by historians to examine media sources and how 
they were intertwined with American policy and the growth of terrorism on a global 
scale, in order to better explain how terrorism became conceptualized as an international 
problem.  
Although the prominent works on the media and terrorism are not historical, they 
illustrate how terrorism is framed in the media in terms of the symbolic rhetoric and 
cultural implications of the term.9  The books view terrorism through the lens of 
                                                        
9 Other works not mentioned:  
Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda, (Quebec: Black Rose 
Books, 1982) 
Abraham H. Miller, ed. Terrorism, The Media, and The Law (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1982) 
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sociology and communication trends in order to analyze the impact of terrorism on the 
media.  Going through the works chronologically, the chapter “Characterizations of Acts 
and Perpetrators of Political Violence in Three Elite U.S. Daily Newspapers,” in the 
edited collection Media Coverage of Terrorism, uses the Los Angeles Times, the New 
York Times, and the Washington Post to consider the characterization of acts of political 
violence, commonly referred to as terrorism.10  Published in 1991, the chapter uses charts 
and graphs to plot the changing issues from 1980-1985 and to characterize terrorism 
during that time period.  The authors, Paul Adams and Robert Picard (professors in 
Journalism and Communications respectively), focus on the language the media use to 
characterize terrorism by tracking the use of particular terms, including “hijacking”, 
“bombing”, “gunman(men)”, and “rebel(s)”.  They conclude that media personnel and 
witnesses tend to use terms that are generally more neutral than those used by 
government officials, who use words that are more judgmental, inflammatory, and 
sensational.11  Christopher Hewitt also uses quantitative evidence to trace the attitudes of 
terrorism among nations.  In his chapter “Public’s Perspectives,” in the edited collection 
Terrorism and the Media, he reveals that the media reflect and reinforce public attitudes, 
and their influence on public opinion depends on the type of public and its prior 
knowledge of the terrorist group.12   
                                                                                                                                                                     
Steven Anzovin, ed. Terrorism, (New York: H.W. Wilson Company, 1986) 
Bethami A. Dobkin, Tales of Terror: Television News and the Construction of the Terrorist Threat, (New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1992) 
Brigitte L. Nacos, Terrorism and the Media (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 
10 Paul D. Adams and Robert Picard, “Characterizations of Acts and Perpetrators of Political Violence in 
Three Elite U.S. Daily Newspapers,” in Media Coverage of Terrorism, ed. A. Odasuo Alali and Kenoye 
Kelvin Eke. (California: SAGE Publishers, 1991),12. 
11 Ibid., 20. 
12 Christopher Hewitt, “Public’s Perspectives,” in Terrorism and the Media, ed. David L. Paletz and Alex 
P. Schmid. ( California: SAGE Publishers, 1992), 5. 
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Looking at the Reagan and Bush administrations, Steven Livingston introduces 
his reader to the idea that terrorism has a special or symbiotic relationship with the news 
media, because news organizations benefit from the drama of terrorism, while terrorists 
benefit from the free publicity given to them.13  Similarly, Gabriel Weimann and Conrad 
Winn refer to the TWA flight 847 hijacking14 as a “miniseries” for T.V. viewers.  Their 
book, The Theater of Terror: Mass Media, uses behavioural and content data to 
quantitively measure how, why, and with what consequences the media have covered 
international terrorism. 15   In Mass-Mediated Terrorism, Brigitte L. Nachos 
acknowledges the attention to acts of political violence that the media promotes, 
specifically in the post-9/11 era.  She concludes that the media sanitize reality, which is 
both a blessing and a handicap, if one considers that understanding the full extent of the 
horror of a terrorist act may be essential for the determination and patience required to 
stamp out all kinds of political violence.16  The Media and the War on Terrorism, edited 
by Stephen Hess and Marvin Kalb, uses candid conversations to illustrate the difficulties 
of reporting during war, while examining the tension between the government and the 
press.   
Robin Brown’s chapter in Framing Terrorism, “Clausewitz in the Age of CNN: 
Rethinking the Military-Media Relationship”, adds an interesting twist to the scholarship 
as he applies valuable historical theory to the study of terrorism and the media.  He 
explains that although Clausewitz did not directly refer to the press, he does provide a 
                                                        
13 Steven Livingston, The Terrorism Spectacle (Colordao: Westview Press, 1994), xii. 
14 A Trans World Airlines plane flying to London, England was hijacked on June 14, 1985 by the Amal 
Movement, a war name for the Islamist Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah. 
15 Gabriel Weinmann and Conrad Winn, The Theater of Terror: Mass Media, (New York: Longman 
Publishing Group, 1994), 12. 
16 Brigitte Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 197. 
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way of placing the issue of government-military-media relations in wartime in a broader 
and more historical perspective.17  Brown’s analysis suggests that the media, military, 
and government are interdependent in times of conflict.  He also recognizes that the 
extent to which the patterns of media reporting shape the political environment has yet to 
be recognized by the public, leaders, or scholars.18  Douglas Kellner, who examines the 
changing role of the media since 9/11, concludes that media spectacles, constructed to 
advance political agendas, distract from real issues.  Using sociological theory, mass 
communications research, and qualitative methods, David Altheide concludes that the 
mass-mediated world must be understood with careful consideration of culture and 
symbolic construction of meanings.19  Finally, Henry Giroux’s Beyond the Spectacle of 
Terrorism, published in 2006, specifically focuses on the “new media”, such as reality 
T.V., in the post-9/11 world.      
The historiography is largely concerned with how terrorism affects media outlets 
and the reporting of news to the public.  The following analysis provides an historical 
perspective which addresses the media’s influence on the conceptualization of terrorism 
in the 1970s.  Instead of quantitatively critiquing the language, I let the language and 
content convey how terrorism, within particular geographic regions, was conceptualized 
by the media during Nixon’s presidency, from January 20, 1969 to August 9, 1974.  To 
represent the American media, I gathered most of my print media from the following 
newspaper sources: the Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, Chicago Daily 
Defender, the Los Angeles Times, and the New York Times.  I also consulted the 
                                                        
17 Robin Brown, “Clausewitz in the Age of CNN: Rethinking the Military-Media Relationship,” in 
Framing Terrorism, ed. Marion Just, Montague Kern, and Pippa Norris. (New York: Routledge, 2003), 43. 
18 Ibid., 55. 
19 David L. Altheide, Terrorism and the Politics of Fear, (Maryland: AltaMira Press, 2006), 8. 
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following periodical sources: Newsweek, TIME, National Review, U.S. News and World 
Report, Américas, Science and Public Affairs – Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Aviation 
Week and Space Technology, and The Nation.  Using these sources, I divided a 
substantive sample of articles that refer to terrorism into the geographical regions most 
represented.  I examined when the American media reported on and how it 
conceptualized terrorist activity in Vietnam, Ireland, South Africa, Canada, Latin 
America, the Middle East and the United States.  My analysis begins with Vietnam, 
which posed large foreign policy issues for Nixon, and ends with the Middle East and the 
United States, the regions most reported on by the media in reference to terrorism.  
Using this methodology I critically interrogate the media coverage to determine 
what type of terror acts are taking place, the motives of the perpetrators, the victims, the 
types of terms used interchangeably with “terrorism”, the difference between state 
terrorism and organizational terrorism, the prominent years reported on, and finally, how 
the media defined terrorism in each particular region.  I look at the language used to 
analyze how the media commented on terrorism within the various regions.  I use specific 
American media examples to demonstrate the rhetoric, tone, and implications associated 
with various terrorist acts.  Although the media did not sympathize with those they 
defined as terrorists, journalists were cautious about supporting legislation that curbed 
civil liberties in the fight against terrorism.  For each region, I give a brief background of 
the political tensions at the time and then I draw out particular themes brought up in the 
media coverage of terrorism.  Once the setting is established, I use the print media 
sources to analyze how the American media articulated terrorism within the seven 
geographic regions in the early 1970s.  Throughout my examination of each region, I also 
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look at the specific time period during the Nixon Presidency in which the bulk of the 
media reports are focused on.  In doing so, I highlight when the media associated 
terrorism with a particular region.  Through an examination of media sources from the 
early 1970s, I determine how the media conceptualized terrorism within various regions 
and during specific times.   
  With hindsight, terrorism can be defined historically by applying elements of the 
tactics, victims, and perpetrators from today to the past; but, in order to fully understand 
terrorism as it was in the 1970s, today’s rhetoric and comprehension of what constitutes 
terrorism must not stand in the way of analyzing how the media conceptualized terrorism 




The Vietnam War was fought between North Vietnam (the Communist-supported 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and South Vietnam (the Republic of Vietnam) from 
1959 to 1975.  In 1965, the United States entered the war as an ally of South Vietnam, 
and its role was well publicized in the American papers.  I draw from dozens of articles 
that specifically classified violence in Vietnam as “terrorism” in 1969 and 1970.  
However, U.S. officials used the word in reference to the Viet Cong (South Vietnamese 
communist rebels supporting North Vietnam) since 1965; therefore, the media also used 
the word “terrorist” to describe the Viet Cong long before the dates I explore.  The media 
brought into question the notion of total war and civilian vulnerability through the 
rhetoric it used to describe the war and violence against civilians.  In wartime, was killing 
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an innocent civilian an act of terrorism, or a casualty of total war?  The sources tended to 
refer to attacks on civilians as terrorism, and attacks on troops as acts of war. It may also 
reference a changing perception of war since the 1940s, when total war presumed the 
involvement and targeting of civilian centres, whether in London, Hamburg, or 
Hiroshima. 
 In February, 1969, allied officials reported that Viet Cong terrorism increased 
nearly 30 per cent in South Vietnam in the previous month.20  According to the New York 
Times, “terrorists killed 501 South Vietnamese civilians and wounded 1,377 in 
January…in the previous month, 393 were killed and 844 wounded.”21  Terrorism 
fluctuated from month to month, and media speculations for the cause of the rise included 
an attempt to influence the Paris Peace Talks, to cripple the accelerated pacification 
program, or to pave the way for an enemy offensive.22  Deaths due to terrorism were 
recorded in the media as civilian deaths again in April, 1969, when it was reported that 
the Viet Cong assassinated 201 civilians in the last week of March.23 
 The articles also used both “terror” and “terrorism” to refer to the tactics of the 
Viet Cong.  For example, the Christian Science Monitor reported: “The Viet Cong 
appears to have launched a new terror campaign in Saigon aimed at undermining the 
South Vietnamese Government.”24  The article continued, saying, “Five terror attacks 
were reported between 6 p.m. Wednesday and noon Thursday.  Five Vietnamese were 
killed and 43 Vietnamese and six Americans were wounded in the capital’s worst rash of 
                                                        
20 “Vietcong Terrorism Up 30% in January; Allied Forces Prepare for ‘All Possibilities’ at Tet Holiday,” 
New York Times, Feb 5, 1969, 11. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
23 “Saigon Tells of Terrorism,” New York Times, Apr 3, 1969, 3. 
24 “The News – Briefly,” Christian Science Monitor, May 9, 1969, 2. 
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terrorism this year.”25  The Washington Post published the following headline: “Enemy 
Switching to Smaller Units, Selective Terrorism, Pentagon Says”, which further 
integrated the terms “terror” and “terrorism”.  The article reported that a Pentagon official 
“sees a more selective terror program rather than a general increase.  There was no 
dispute on reports that terror seemed to be getting more attention by enemy tacticians.”26  
The Washington Post clarified that “what the war-watchers mean by selectivity is that 
enemy terror squads seem to be concentrated on killing or abducting principals in South 
Vietnam’s self-defense and pacification forces rather than indiscriminate terrorizing, such 
as burning villages.”27  In this article it was clear that “terror” and “terrorism” were often 
used interchangeably to explain the death of civilians, but it did not differentiate between 
the use of terrorism against civilians and a policy of terror normally used in war.  An 
article in the Los Angeles Times in May, 1969, made a subtle distinction when it said “the 
Vietnam war heated up sharply today with an outburst of shellings and ground clashes 
across the country and a renewed terrorism in Saigon.”28  The headline “Shellings, 
Terrorism” grammatically separates the two violent forms.  This is reiterated as the New 
York Times reported that “battlefield action remained low [on September 25, 1969] but 
terrorism against civilians continued.”29   TIME acknowledged that terrorism by the 
Communists against South Vietnamese civilians was not carried out at random.  
Thousands of Vietnamese were killed in well-planned massacres.30 
                                                        
25 “The News – Briefly,” 2. 
26 George C. Wilson, “Enemy Switching to Smaller Units, Selective Terrorism, Pentagon Says,” 
Washington Post, Sep 4, 1969, A22. 
27 Ibid. 
28 “Shellings, Terrorism: War Heating Up,” 1. 
29 “Battle Activity Low in Vietnam As Acts of Terrorism Continue,” New York Times, Sep 25, 1969, 4. 
30 “On the Other Side: Terror as Policy,” TIME, Dec 5, 1969, 29. 
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 The American media overwhelmingly reported the terrorism to be the work of the 
Viet Cong.  The victims were portrayed as both South Vietnamese citizens and 
Americans.  The motives of the perpetrators are unique because they were at war; 
therefore, they killed civilians to weaken the enemy.  TIME addressed the disbelief of 
Americans after the My Lai massacre31 details were released, admitting that this massacre 
by American forces paled in comparison to the atrocities reportedly committed by the 
Viet Cong.  “For shocked Americans, what happened at My Lai seems an awful 
aberration.  For the Communists in Vietnam, the murder of civilians is routine, 
purposeful policy.”32  Furthermore, “terror is part of the guerrillas’ arsenal of 
intimidation, to be used whenever other methods of persuasion have failed to rally a 
village or province round the Viet Cong flag.”33  American media outlets stifled details 
on U.S. involvement in the My Lai massacre so as to not hinder public-support during the 
war.  It would only be after the full U.S. withdrawal that the atrocities committed by 
American forces were revealed through the media. 
 
Ireland      
 Between 1969 and 1974, Ireland continued to face civil violence between the 
Catholic-Nationalist-South and the Protestant-Unionist-North.  The media coverage on 
the violence was spread between 1969, 1971, 1972, and 1973.  Bloodshed in Ireland 
would continue into the following decades, but the American media sparingly reported on 
the outbursts in the early 1970s.  In August, 1969, dormant tensions were renewed as 
                                                        
31 The torture and mass murder of unarmed South Vietnamese citizens in the hamlets of My Lai and My 
Khe by the U.S. Army forces on March 16, 1968. 
32 “On the Other Side: Terror as Policy,” 29. 
33 Ibid. 
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Catholics attacked British troops who landed in Northern Ireland to protect the Catholic 
minority.34  The media likened the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the post-WWII era to 
the Viet Cong.  One source described the IRA as “a terrorist guerrilla gang of the 
Vietcong sort, and its depredations in Northern Ireland played a large part in the 
formation of Ulster’s auxiliary constabulary, the ‘B-specialists,’ whose conduct in the 
recent riots terrorized Northern Catholics.”35  Likewise, a 1971 Los Angeles Times article 
read: “Like their fellows in Vietnam, the youth of Northern Ireland find release from 
overwhelming frustration or pent idealism in active hatred.”36  This was a strong 
comparison for the media to draw, especially during a time in the United States when the 
Viet Cong was so deeply resented.  The media were referring to the similar “guerrilla 
gang” image and idealistic objectives of the two groups, for the Viet Cong terrorist tactics 
were used during a war with the U.S. and South Vietnam, whereas the IRA’s bombings 
and terror were during a civil war infused with religious tensions. 
The media coverage of Ireland tended to blur the line between war and terrorism.  
A January, 1972, Chicago Daily Defender article asserted that “total war between the 
authorities and the I.R.A. erupted in August when the Ulster Government invoked the 
Special Powers Act and detained 362 suspects.”37  The Los Angeles Times in March, 
1972, contended that the IRA was “fighting a guerrilla war to wrest predominantly 
Protestant Ulster from Britain and unite it with the Roman Catholic Irish Republic.”38  As 
troops were stationed and violence became an everyday occurrence, the media on 
                                                        
34 Robert S. Elegant, “The Children Learn to Hate,” The Los Angeles Times, Dec 3, 1971, F12. 
35 Edward Aloysins O’Neill, “‘Troubles’ in Ulster Reopen Healing Irish Wounds,” Washington Post, Aug 
24, 1969, 33. 
36 Elegant, F12.  
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occasion used the term “war” to describe IRA violence.  The targets of the violence 
shifted in 1972 to ‘soft’ targets, including pubs, hotels, and shops.  Hard targets such as 
army posts and guarded utilities were increasingly avoided.39  To the media, this shift 
symbolized a turn to total war where anyone was a target.  Using bombing, sniping, fires, 
and acts of propaganda, the terrorists lashed out at Irish citizens, with only some reports 
of violence directed against law enforcement officials.40   
The media defined the terrorists as members from organized factions, specifically 
the IRA.  Their motives were wrapped up in an intense hatred for the opposing side, 
drawn along religious lines.  The media were not sympathetic with the cause of the IRA. 
An opinion piece in the Washington Post, in August, 1972, reported that the IRA’s fight 
for a free Northern Ireland was a myth, for “the victims of the IRA’s bombs are, 
overwhelmingly, Irish civilians.”41  The New York Times reported that the IRA had three 
chief sources of inspiration, which included the Irgun Zvei Leumi, the Jewish terrorists 
who fought the British in Palestine, the terrorist National Liberation Front in Algeria, and 
the Cypriot guerrillas who fought British soldiers in the 1940s.42  To the media, the IRA 
found inspiration from such other terrorist organizations and struck out against innocent 
civilians: it was clear that the media were not compassionate to the cause of a free 
Northern Ireland.  However, this lack of sympathy could be further studied by analyzing 
the religious backgrounds of the reporters, or cities where their writing was 
predominantly published.  If a reporter or city’s background was Catholic, then he or she 
may have interpreted the violence of the IRA differently than would a Protestant, or 
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40 Ibid. 
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reporter writing for a predominately Protestant audience.  The religious tensions that 
were at the centre of the conflict in Ireland undoubtedly influenced how the American 
media interpreted the events.   
Some media outlets understood that measures to curb IRA violence would be hard 
to enforce.  In order to deal with the rising tide of violence in August, 1971, the Northern 
Ireland Government announced “emergency powers of internment without trial.  The 
move was aimed at the outlawed Irish Republican Army in an effort to put down the 
terrorism gripping the province.”43  Los Angeles Times reporter Richard Clutterbuck 
explained that “the problem here is that the offenses which it is necessary to schedule 
cover extraordinarily wide ground.  How does one judge in advance whether a murder 
was a terrorist murder?  Or whether the motives of an arsonist were political or 
criminal?”44  Although the media were clear that the IRA were terrorists, they were still 
liberal about the slippery slope of curbing civil liberties.  While the members of the IRA 
wholeheartedly believed they were fighting for their country and their independent 
survival, the media, on the whole, did not empathize with their struggle. 
 
South Africa 
 South Africa was politically and racially charged in the 1970s.  The black African 
majority suffered under apartheid, legalized racial segregation, enforced since 1948 at the 
hands of the National Party of the Government, which stemmed from years of Dutch and 
English colonial rule.  The system of apartheid sparked internal unrest among the black 
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majority in South Africa in the name of liberation, yet it was deemed terrorism by the 
government.  The Terrorism Act was established to give powers of censorship, detentions 
without trial, torture, and banning political opposition.   
Of all of the regions analyzed in this essay, South Africa was least represented in 
the media.  Although the coverage was sparse, the American media mainly reported on 
terrorism in the region from 1969 to 1973.  Much of the media attention on Africa 
covered the cases that fell under the Terrorism Act, and were not leading news stories.  
Buried on page 16 in the New York Times, an article on February 12, 1969, reported that 
“Thirteen black Africans, one woman, were charged in the Supreme Court at 
Pietermaritzburg, Natal…with conspiring to foment terrorism in South Africa.”45  The 
government accused these offenders of attempting to set up a trail for terrorists to enter 
South Africa from the north border, inciting armed attacks on the republic.46  The media 
addressed the accused as “black Africans”, not as “terrorists.”  In regards to this region, 
the media sympathized with the men and women fighting against apartheid, whereas the 
Terrorism Act and oppression at the hands of the government was subtly scrutinized 
A Christian Science Monitor article in July, 1969, highlighted that the death 
penalty was imposed at an increasing rate in South Africa while there was a worldwide 
trend towards its abolition.47  In South Africa, “offenses liable to the capital punishment 
penalty include treason, murder, rape, armed or violent robbery, child stealing, and 
certain crimes under the terrorism and suppression of communism acts.”48  The media 
once again saw the problem of how to differentiate certain offences and define acts of 
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terrorism.  It was also clear in the reports that it was the white minority in South Africa 
which decided what constituted terrorism.  The corrupt system was evident in an August, 
1970, New York Times article that reported that twenty black Africans were charged with 
activities aimed at the violent overthrow of the government.  However, the defendants 
contended that they were found not guilty in February of the offences “for which they are 
now charged and that the acts alleged in February to have been committed by them are so 
substantially similar to the present charges as to make their present prosecution 
‘oppressive, vexatious and an abuse of the process of the court.’”49  Those charged 
included the wife of Nelson Mandela, former leader of the African National Congress.  
The men and women were charged with “being members of banned organizations such as 
the African National Congress and the South African Communist party in a conspiracy 
for the violent overthrow of the government.”50  The media’s report that the charges were 
repeated from an earlier arraignment highlighted the tyrannical legal system at work in 
South Africa.  In this case, like others, the black Africans accused of terrorism by the 
South African government were not considered terrorists by the American media.  The 
system of apartheid and the Terrorism Act, however, were reported as unfair and unjust 
through examples of unfair accusations and hearings.    
A further example that received the most media attention was the case of 
Reverend Gonville French-Beytagh, the Anglican Dean of Johannesburg. According to 
the Los Angeles Times, under the Terrorism Act, in November 1971, the Dean was 
sentenced to five years imprisonment after being found guilty under the South African 
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Terrorism Act.51  He was accused of 10 offences, including plotting the violent overthrow 
of the South African government, to which he pleaded innocent.52  The following year, 
the New York Times reported that an appellate panel of South Africa’s Supreme Court 
threw out the conviction of Reverend Gonville French-Beytagh, ruling that “the Dean’s 
outspoken opposition to apartheid did not constitute subversion, even under the Terrorism 
Act.  It said his fear that violence would result from racial oppression did not mean he 
desired or advocated violence.”53  The case of the Dean was followed throughout the 
American media and his detention under the Terrorism Act was scrutinized.  The media 
reflected the growing international uneasiness with the system of apartheid.   
Reverend Gonville French-Beytagh was held up as an example in the media that 
on occasion the Supreme Court of South Africa recognized the injustice of the Terrorism 
Act.  The New York Times included a fitting quote by one of the Dean’s colleagues who 
celebrated the not guilty verdict, saying, “The question of the inequality of the Terrorism 
Act is still with us and we must work toward its repeal.”54  The colleague and the media 
offered an important reminder that only eight days earlier, thirteen non-white South 
Africans had been sentenced to terms of five to eight years under the same infamous law, 
many of whom testified that they had been tortured in police interrogation.55  According 
to the New York Times, the Dean’s case “cannot obscure either the barbarities of 
apartheid or the relentless punishment meted out under monstrous laws to many of those 
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– especially the nonwhites – struggling against the system.”56  To the media, although 
this case stood as a victory, the fight against injustice in South Africa was far from over.   
The American media did not refer to the black Africans as terrorists, yet it did not 
go so far as to controversially tag the white government as conducting state terrorism.  
The black Africans were fighting for national liberation, but this objective was not clearly 
highlighted in the media until terrorism was proposed for the United Nations (UN) 
agenda in the fall of 1972, in the wake of the Black September terrorist attack at the 
Munich Olympics.  The American media made it apparent that Africans “feared that a 
debate on terrorism would injure the struggles of national liberation movements against 
white rule in Southern Africa.”57  Secretary General Kurt Waldheim “tried to forestall the 
African moves by telling the committee yesterday that his proposed item was not 
intended ‘To affect principles enunciated by the General Assembly regarding colonial 
and dependent peoples seeking independence and liberation.’”58  The issue of whether or 
not black African liberation was classified as terrorism came to the front stage as the UN 
debated how to globally define and police terrorism.  According to the American media, 
black Africans who reacted to an oppressive white regime did not fall under their 
definition of terrorism. 
 
Canada 
 Between 1969 and 1970 the American media covered terrorist bombings in 
Quebec.  The media made it clear that terrorism on Canadian soil stood as an example 
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that terrorism could happen anywhere, even in stable, democratic countries.  The media 
was sure to specify that the terrorists were from a particular group striking out at 
prominent Quebeckers and government officials in the name of separatism.  This group, 
the Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) was founded in the early 1960s and its violence 
climaxed with the “October Crisis” in 1970.  The FLQ was a Marxist group that wanted 
to fight against oppressors (English-speaking Quebecers) and for a Quebec independent 
from Canada.  The group likened itself to other liberation causes, such as Cuba and 
Vietnam.  The American media pigeonholed the FLQ as a small, violent minority that 
created an atmosphere of fear in Quebec for several years. 
 On June 21, 1969, “hundreds of extra police patrolled Quebec City to guard 
against more terrorism aimed at disrupting the leadership conference of the National 
Union, which controls the provincial government.”59  Earlier that day, three bombs 
exploded in parts of the city and a Molotov cocktail was thrown through an open window 
at the Château Frontenac, but no one was injured.60  In 1969 the media did not 
specifically place blame on any one terrorist group.  At the time it was not known 
whether the attacks were by separatists or the result of a labour dispute.  In August, 1969, 
the Los Angeles Times reported that “a bomb heavily damaged a government building in 
the city of Quebec” and “eight incendiary bombs were discovered in a downtown 
Montreal branch of Eaton’s department store.”61  In September, “a terrorist bomb 
exploded at the home of Mayor Jean Drapeau…less than a week after 24-hour police 
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surveillance there was discontinued.”62  In these examples the terrorists were not named, 
although the media made it clear that they were the work of either separatists or union 
workers.  However, by 1970, bombings became frequent in Montreal and the media 
attributed the violence to “separatist extremists.”63   
In October, 1970, a series of violent bombings and the kidnappings of British 
diplomat James Cross and Pierre Laporte became known as the “October Crisis”, and 
resulted in the Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, invoking the War Measures Act.  
These emergency wartime powers meant that the Canadian government had wide powers 
to arrest and detain suspected terrorists.  The American media focused on the details of 
the events and Canadians’ reactions to the implementation of the act, rather than passing 
judgment on the curbing of civil liberties.  Canada, a fellow democratic state and 
neighbour, was too close to home to condemn the strong government actions taken by 
Trudeau to curb the bombings.  The media reported on the debates in Canada that 
surrounded the decision to invoke the emergency measures.  According to the media, 
many politicians defended the action, such as the federal Minister of Regional Economic 
Affairs, Jean Marchand, who said that “the front had ‘enough dynamite to blow up the 
heart of Montreal.’  The terrorist organization has thousands of machine guns and 
rifles.”64  According to the reports, the Canadian public and the government 
acknowledged the need for new federal legislation to replace the War Measures Act.  The 
bill would “devise a new category of ‘crimes against the nation,’”65 including “sedition, 
treason, and conspiracy, which have been some of the weapons of the FLQ terrorists. 
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And the legislation would presumably give the government clear but specific powers to 
deal with future terrorists, urban guerrillas, and advocates of violent overthrow.”66   
During the October Crisis, the media reported on the adjustment made by 
Montreal citizens to the presence of armed guards, soldiers, and police officers in the 
streets.  In the four days from the date the wartime powers were put in place to October 
21, 1970, the police made “1,628 raids without warrants and, also without warrants, have 
arrested 334 persons suspected of being members or sympathizers of the front.”67  The 
fear of the unknown power and capability of the FLQ meant that the American media 
supported the Canadian government’s increase in federal and police powers during the 
crisis.  To the media, the terrorists were a small group of extremists who sought to wreak 
havoc on a democratic society for an ill-supported objective. 
The media frequently gave background information on the FLQ to define them.  
According to the FLQ manifesto, as quoted in the New York Times, “That which we call 
democracy in Quebec is nothing but the democracy of the rich.”68  The FLQ’s members 
were “largely students in their teens and twenties.  The activists among them, the 
bombers, bank robbers, and kidnappers, perhaps 120 persons, according to a Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police report, are divided into 22 cells….there are also about 2,000 
non-active members.”69  Although the FLQ may have seen themselves as freedom 
fighters, the media described their actions and motives as terrorist.   
The American media also touched on the deeply rooted French-English tensions 
in Canada.  The New York Times reported that historic French Canadian resentment of 
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English domination, and the Roman Catholic Church’s tradition of respect for authority, 
explained why some Quebeckers were sympathetic towards the FLQ manifesto, but most 
applauded the government crackdown.70  According to a Gallup poll mentioned in the 
same article, French Canadians were only slightly less approving of the government 
measures than all Canadians, which is to say they were heavily in favour of them.71  
Although the crackdown on civil liberties was debated in Canada at the time, the New 
York Times made the comment: “That there was not more criticism might seem 
remarkable to Americans.  Canada, however, has only statutory, not constitutional 
guarantees of civil liberties and they were suspended by the Cabinet’s action.  Moreover, 
most English Canadians are indifferent or hostile to French Canada.”72  Although the 
government’s increase of power was seen as extreme by some, it was ultimately seen as 
justified by the majority of Canadians and the American media, given the situation.   
Finally, with the release of James Cross, the kidnappers were granted “safe 
passage” to Cuba as guaranteed by the Canadian government.73  The issue of nations 
supporting and harbouring terrorists was brought up in the media coverage of the UN 
proceedings in 1972.  The American media allied itself with the many countries in favour 
of ending terrorism around the world, which was in line with America’s political stance 
on the issue, but this opinion was juxtaposed with countries that would give those defined 
as terrorists by the American media a safe haven.  The media attributed the ills of anti-
terrorism to the fact that not all nations condemned terrorism as it was defined by the 
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West, and therefore the international community had difficulty moving forward in rooting 
out terrorism.   
 
Latin America       
 The American media most often referred to terrorism in Latin American with 
words such as “urban terrorism”, “guerrilla violence”, and “rebel forces.”  The most 
extensive media coverage of the region spanned the years 1969 to 1972.  During that 
time, many countries in Latin America faced terrorism in the form of kidnappings, 
robberies, raids, fires, bombs, assassinations, and other various forms of violent protest.  
Terrorists in Brazil were described as left-wing guerrillas and disgruntled former soldiers 
in the ranks of the urban guerrillas.74  Bank robberies were often equated with terrorism 
in the American media.  The Los Angeles Times reported that in Brazil in July, 1969, 
“hardly a week [went] by without a bombing incident.  Bank robberies [were] equally 
frequent, many of them believed to be the work of terrorists.”75  Money from bank 
robberies was used to finance the groups’ operations and to buy arms in preparation for 
expanded operations.76  The flow of money into terrorist organizations from the robberies 
meant that such criminal activity was labelled as terrorism.   
By September, 1969, if there was any doubt about the seriousness of Communist-
supported terrorism that was on the rise in Brazil, the kidnapping of United States 
Ambassador Charles B. Elbrick dispelled it.77  The kidnapping of diplomats in Latin 
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America received substantial media coverage in the early 1970s.  In March, 1970, the 
Christian Science Monitor reported that Japanese Consul General Nobuo Okuchi was 
kidnapped in São Paulo by persons who demanded that the government release five 
political prisoners.78  The New York Times ran an article in April, 1970, on the murder of 
West German Ambassador Count Karl von Spreti at the hands of Guatemalan terrorists.79  
The media made it clear that the kidnappers’ aim was for political ransom and the acts 
were not directed at the countries of the diplomats. For example, Elbrick’s kidnapping by 
Communist groups was not specifically against him or the United States, but for 
ransom.80  In Brazil, the military junta termed the kidnapping an example of “pure and 
simple terrorism,” as did the media.81  Holding diplomats hostage was a propaganda 
victory for the terrorists because the kidnappings were covered throughout American 
media sources.  According to the Christian Science Monitor, this also proved the ability 
of the terrorists and suggested that more incidents were likely to follow.82 
 In Guatemala, terrorism and sabotage were also on the rise in the early 1970s.  
The Christian Science Monitor classified the terrorists there as rebels from both the Left 
and Right, including members of the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes of the Left and the 
Mano Blanco of the Right.83  However, media reports largely associated terrorism with 
left-wing rebel groups resisting right-wing government dictatorships.  The term 
“guerrillas” was often used by the American media interchangeably with “terrorists.” The 
media reported that armed guerrillas attacked police, gunmen killed secret service men, 
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and dozens of stores were hit by fires, all within a two-week span in December, 1969.  
With this violence, there resulted the suspension of certain constitutional provisions.  The 
media were suspicious of the actions taken by the government that restricted the right of 
free movement throughout the country, and allowed “the police to make searches and 
arrests without warrant.  Provisions for free speech remain in force, but news media have 
been warned to tone down reports which might result in disturbances and to give 
immediate publicity to government announcements.”84  The American media were once 
again troubled by a foreign government’s suspension of civil liberties, namely freedom of 
the press; however, the actions against terrorists were reluctantly justified because 
innocent victims, namely American diplomats, were being targeted. 
 In the same period, the United States found dozens of planes being hijacked to 
Cuba as a safe haven for American terrorists.  This reached epidemic proportions in 
1969-1970, though media reports on the incidents were sparse and only overall statistics 
were available.  For example, in 1969 the New York Times reported that “worldwide there 
were 88 attempted hijackings; 70 of them were successful, of which 58 went to Cuba, 12 
to other countries; in 1970, 84 attempts, 54 successful, of which 31 went to Cuba and 23 
to other countries.”85  There were no names of the hijackers or details of the incidents 
printed in the early 1970s.  However, the media commented on the open dialogue 
between Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and President Nixon to efficiently deal with the 
common problem in 1972.86  The media mentions Cuba’s support for many terrorist 
actions throughout the world on several occasions, as Cuba viewed the fight for a 
revolution at any cost as a fruitful effort.  The notion of Cuba as a safe haven for 
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terrorists frustrated the American media and the Nixon Administration throughout the 
1970s, as did Cuba’s continued support of terrorism in Latin America and its 
revolutionary acts throughout the world. 
 Brazil, Guatemala, and Cuba are only three examples of what the media 
perceived to be terrorist hotbeds in Latin America.  In my sampling, the media also 
published articles on Argentina, Chile, Venezuela, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic.  
The American media clearly portrayed Latin American terrorism as the outrageous 
violence of the extreme left.  Some reports referred to right-wing violence, but the media 
rarely used the term “terrorism” to define the violence committed by right-wing, 
autocratic governments.  Articles briefly touched on counter-terror measures, but with 
American diplomats at risk, along with the long history of American intervention in Latin 
America, the media were not quick to point the finger at the oppressive regimes in power 
in many of the countries in the early 1970s.  This attitude changed when the issue of 
harbouring terrorists threatened the safety of Americans abroad.  
 
The Middle East   
 In the early 1970s the Middle East was becoming a serious threat to global 
security as acts of terrorism continued to escalate.  The Palestinian nationalist group, the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), commanded the most media 
attention of the terrorist groups in the early years of Nixon’s presidency.  The PFLP 
opposed a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and felt that land rightfully 
belonging to the Palestinians was wrongly in the hands of Israel.  To the American 
media, what made the Middle East situation so volatile was that this form of terrorism 
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involved more countries than those directly involved, namely countries that harboured 
terrorists, and those that supported Israel.  Terrorism in the Middle East was vastly 
covered by the media during each year of Nixon’s Presidency.  While a number of 
articles were published from 1969-1971, the volume of coverage soared with the Munich 
Olympics in 1972 and continued in 1973 and 1974. 
The American media largely spoke out against the Arab cause in the ongoing 
Arab-Israeli conflict, which was in line with America’s political support for Israel.  
American foreign policy in the 1970s was protective of Israeli interests, and much of the 
news media took to Israel’s defence against terrorist attacks.  For example, the Los 
Angeles Times editorialized in 1969 that “the terrorist groups like to speak romantically 
of a ‘popular war’ of ‘liberation.’  This is nonsense.  Their real goal is to provide another 
war – and if need be another and another after that – between Israel and the Arabs, with 
the hope of someday destroying the Jewish state.”87  The Christian Science Monitor 
reported that the Palestinian liberation groups were attacking to lure Israel into a massive 
response, and in turn the retaliations by Israel would act as lightning rods for world 
condemnation of what the Russians and the Arabs termed ‘Israeli aggression.’88  Joseph 
Alsop of the Washington Post saw the danger in the escalation of brutal Arab terrorism 
that would provoke Israeli retaliation “of a much more dangerous kind.”89 The Christian 
Science Monitor published an article by Arnold Soloway (author of Truth and Peace in 
the Middle East) that was blatantly pro-Israel.  Soloway boldly stated that the terrorists’ 
notion that the establishment of “an independent Palestine state would bring an end to 
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terror and war is lamentably wrong.  The one thing the terrorists do not want, what their 
fanatical horrors are aimed to prevent, is any kind of peace or accommodation with 
Israel.”90  He continued, saying the terrorists “will settle for nothing less than the 
complete dissolution of the state of Israel and the expulsion of virtually all its Jewish 
inhabitants.”91  Throughout the article, Soloway continually supported the legitimacy of 
Israel and condemned Arab terrorists and Arab countries that encourage them.   
One article in my survey, printed in the Los Angeles Times, gave the Arab view of 
Israel.  William Coughlin reported that Arabs believed that Israel was not “born in 
struggle and matured into freedom, but that Israel was conceived in deceit, was born in 
terrorism and matured into arrogance.”92  Coughlin does not go as far as to support Arab 
aggressive actions; rather, he frames them against the usual unquestioned American 
support of Israel.  He explained that the Arabs see an Israel which has “driven Palestinian 
Arabs from their homeland and turned them into refugees by the hundreds of thousands, 
basing its claim to their land on a brief occupation centuries ago and ignoring the rights 
of the people who lived on it for the hundreds of years afterward.”93  After giving the 
background of the conflict through the lens of the Palestinians, Coughlin concluded that 
“the Arabs see a militarily powerful and expansionist Israel, backed by the prestige of the 
United States.  Thus the Arabs see an Israel that foments terror and promotes 
aggression.”94  Given America’s general support for Israel, Coughlin’s article stood as an 
anomaly.  Most of the media supported Israel’s actions and condemned Arab aggression. 
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 According to media reports, terrorism in the Middle East came in various forms, 
including kidnapping, hijacking, bombings, mail bombs, and other diverse forms of 
attack.  In reports on terrorism in the Middle East, often the region or religion of the 
terrorists preceded the term “terrorist” in the media’s description.  For example, TIME 
magazine reported in 1969 that Jordanian terrorists shattered El Al’s downtown Athens 
passenger terminal with a hand grenade.95  That same year, TIME reported that four Arab 
terrorists from Lebanon began shooting up an El Al jetliner as it taxied toward takeoff in 
Zurich.96  The American media used similar descriptions to describe terrorists in the 
Middle East when covering the violence in the early 1970s.   
When terrorists in the Middle East began to target Jews from both Israel and 
foreign countries, the American media painted an even darker picture of the terrorists, 
particularly the PFLP, as they targeted innocent airplane passengers.  After an attempted 
hijacking of a Trans World Airlines flight from Athens in 1969, the PFLP promised to 
follow up the attempt and a ‘final warning to tourists’ was published in TIME.  This 
warning said: “Do not travel to Israel.  Israel is under fire.  Do not visit or come near 
Israeli embassies or offices of El Al Airlines anywhere in the world.  Bombs may be 
waiting for you.  Stay neutral.  Be safe.  Keep away.”97  The media emphasized the 
seriousness of the PFLP in 1969 when its agents forced a Trans World Airlines plane that 
was headed for Israel to land in Syria, where Syrians imprisoned two Israeli civilian 
passengers for three months.98  After international hijackings made headlines again and 
again, the American media and voices from around the world called for international 
                                                        
95 “The Air,” TIME, Dec 5, 1969, 57. 
96 “Exporting Violence,” TIME, Jan 5, 1970, 28. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Francis Ofner, “Air-piracy Law Proposed,” Christian Science Monitor, Mar 2, 1970, 2. 
  39 
safety measures for Israelis, as well as Jews from different countries, who were 
considered targets.99   
The details of the Munich massacre and the global implications of the attack 
gained much media attention in the fall of 1972.  The media made it clear that before any 
progress could be made in peace negotiations in the Middle East, an international effort 
had to be made to curb terrorism.100  Israel and the American media saw the support of 
terrorist groups such as Black September by other Arab nations, including Syria, 
Lebanon, and Egypt, as a “new form of warfare” against Israel.101  Israeli Foreign 
Minister Abba Eban affirmed that Israel would not sit by and be attacked, saying “‘it has 
always been our [Israel’s] policy to hit where we can those who make war against us…it 
is not our policy or duty to wait for the saboteurs to kill us or our children.’”102  After 
Munich, Israel took matters into its own hands to covertly assassinate Arab terrorists 
believed to be involved in the Munich attack.  This counter-terror was viewed by the 
media as “unconventional and unexpected unilateral action by Israel aimed at rooting out 
Arab terrorist cells wherever they may be on the European continent, and direct action 
against the interests of Arab states that sponsor or protect terrorist organizations.”103  To 
the American media, this retaliation only stunted any hope of peace talks.  However, the 
media acknowledged that while it was frustration and desperation that drove the Arab 
terrorists seeking political expression, Israel shared the sentiments while seeking fuller 
world respect and political comforts.104  Due to America’s vulnerability because of its 
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support for Israel and its foreign policy entanglements, Munich was a pivotal turning 
point in the American media’s conceptualization of terrorism.  The massacre permanently 
altered the way the media and the American government viewed terrorism.     
In the wake of the attack at the Munich Olympics, the media reported on 
America’s support for Israel as Nixon sought “international action to curb terrorism 
against Israelis, and began tightening protection of foreign diplomats and others 
susceptible to terrorist acts in the United States.”105  The media particularly feared further 
Arab attacks after a number of threats were made against foreign diplomats in the U.S.106 
The Nixon Administration’s pro-Israel stance was reiterated in the media, as they 
supported a major effort to identify Arab nationals in the U.S. and enforce tighter visa 
requirements.107 Many news articles called for airline pilots and ground crews to refuse to 
fly to countries that supported Arab terrorists.  As well, the media believed that the 
United States “should point out to all the Arab states as forcefully as possible how 
difficult it will be to muster sympathy for non-violent Palestinians when such barbaric 
tactics are employed in their name.”108  The news media believed that the U.S. should 
take a stand internationally to curb the rising threat of terrorism. 
 When framing the perpetrators of Arab aggression, the media emphasized that it 
was important to remember that the terrorists were not governments, they did not legally 
control territory, but neither were they unreachable.109  It was eloquently put by the Los 
Angeles Times in an article in February, 1970, that Arab terrorist organizations “exist and 
are able to act only with the cooperation of the governments of a number of Arab states.  
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It is those governments that must be held accountable for what the terrorists do.”110  The 
media called for government accountability on this issue.  Reporters wanted the Nixon 
Administration and foreign governments to crack down on the harbouring of terrorists.  
This notion was exemplified by the coverage of the diversion of flights to Syria for a safe 
haven, and most prominently by the request of the Munich terrorists for a safe passage to 
Egypt.  For example, the Los Angeles Times reported that the terrorists at the Munich 
Olympics “operate under a perverse ethic that is beyond the reach of moral indignation or 
diplomatic protest.  But they do not operate in isolation.  They must have havens, they 
must have friends…without such backing the terrorists could not long function or 
survive.”111  In the wake of the Munich massacre, the media conveyed fears of further 
Arab attacks as guerrilla threats were made in Arab countries, which demanded the 
freedom for three Arab terrorists who were captured after their attempt to barter the lives 
of Israeli hostages.112  The media’s fear of retaliation was exacerbated by reports on mail 
bombs aimed at Israeli diplomats in late 1972 that fuelled Israel’s cry for revenge.113 
 At the UN General Assembly in 1972, terrorism was proposed to be on the 
agenda following the murders in Munich.  The media coverage of the UN debates in 1972 
also gave insight into the political tensions rooted in the conflict.  The media reported that 
the Arab bloc immediately sought to keep the question off the agenda and, failing that, 
made an all-out attempt to divert the discussion from terrorism itself to the conditions that 
inspire people to commit acts of terrorism.114  Meanwhile, Israel and South American 
countries backed U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers’ call for an international treaty 
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against terrorism,115 which would “provide for the prosecution or extradition of persons 
who kill, seriously injure or kidnap innocent civilians in one country for the purpose of 
harming or obtaining concessions from another country, or from an international 
organization.”116  Like the African bloc, which feared the UN concession would affect 
their fight for liberation, the Arab nations believed that Western pressure for any anti-
terrorism measures were in effect pro-Israeli and directed against Arab countries.117  The 
UN did not gain any concrete ground in 1972 in the passing of sanctions against 
terrorism, and the media acknowledged that the world would continue to be plagued by 
violence that was not internationally condemned.  By 1974, Middle East terrorism 
continued to increase and, for the American media, a merely domestic perspective of 
terrorism was inadequate.  It was political terrorism that was conspicuously on the global 
increase and would demand American media attention into the next century.118   
 
The United States of America 
 Although the U.S. was concerned with international terrorism between 1969 and 
1974, the nation also faced terrorism on its own soil.  The rising spirit of revolution in the 
1960s turned violent from 1969 to 1972.  Terrorism in the U.S. was typically reported as 
bombings (particularly by youths aimed at establishment targets), kidnappings, Ku Klux 
Klan violence, or gang warfare.  Klansmen were described as terrorists by the Christian 
Science Monitor, which reported that “three Klansmen were found guilty of contempt of 
Congress in 1966 after an investigation by the House Committee on Un-American 
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Activities into allegations of Klan terrorism in the South.”119  Although few reports 
focused on the Klan by 1969, they were nonetheless considered terrorists by the Christian 
Science Monitor, albeit a newspaper from the northeastern U.S.   
Reports of bombings aimed at American global corporations, government 
property, and military trucks, among other targets, were rampant in the early 1970s.  With 
the bombings throughout American cities came hundreds of bomb threats that disturbed 
institutions, government offices, and public places.  The American media saw the bomb 
threats themselves as nuisances more than anything else.  Along with each reported bomb 
explosion, the media mentioned several bomb threats.  Reports on bombings were tied to 
the volatile times of 1969 and 1970.  In the early 1960s, protest movements were militant, 
but not violent.  Most of the early movements took after the Civil Rights Movement and 
Martin Luther King’s non-violent approach.  However, by 1968, protest became a global 
phenomenon and the world seemed to be unravelling.  By 1969 people began talking 
about a revolution and the mood of protests in the early 1970s took a violent turn, as 
some youths saw violence as the only way to fight what they saw as imperialist and 
corporate America.   
The media attributed the violence to the extreme right and left.  For example, in 
February, 1969, the Los Angeles Times reported on members of an extreme-right-wing 
group, the Society of  Man, who were arrested for a siege of bombings and terrorism on 
the San Francisco Peninsula.120  The targets of these bombings were several liberal and 
left-wing organizations, including the Kennedy Action Corps, a bookstore chain, and the 
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Midpeninsula Free University.121  The media gave details of several places where bombs 
exploded.  For example, in New York City in 1969, bombs went off on a United Fruit 
Company pier, at the Marine Midland Grace Trust Company, the Federal Office Building 
was hit in October, and in one hour one night, dynamite bombs exploded at three 
skyscrapers – the Chase Manhattan Building, the new General Motors Building and in the 
offices of Standard Oil in Rockefeller Center.122  The media emphasized that the bombs 
were aimed at American corporate imperialism in protest against the Vietnam War, not at 
ordinary civilians.  The media described the bombers as white “revolutionaries” who 
went beyond rhetoric and confrontation to the tactics of outright terrorism.123  With this, 
the media were not sympathetic to the terrorists’ cause.  Although sit-in protests against 
the war in Vietnam were acceptable, violence was not.   
The media reported that the radicals took the issue of corporate corruption 
seriously, but the majority of the American public did not share this sentiment.  The 
National Review reported in 1970 that in the San Francisco-Berkeley area, “a thousand 
New Leftists and Street People went on a destructive rampage, bombs were thrown at the 
police station.”124  The actions of young leftists were seen as a “destructive rampage”, not 
actions justified in the name of peace.  A journalist for the radical Berkeley Barb likened 
the scene in San Francisco to the Vietnam War, saying, “All the cops around Park Station 
wear the faces of men at war…The faces at Park Station are the faces of American patrols 
coming back from a night with the Viet Cong.  The face of being stuck with a war where 
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the natives used to be friendly.  But this is a war at home.”125  The media made clear that 
bombs on campuses and those that targeted corporations only resulted in a few deaths, 
because most of the terrorists did not intend for people to be in the buildings at the time 
of the bombings.  However, there was a growing fear in the media that Americans, 
especially the government, were under siege by radicals.  This is exactly how 
revolutionary groups like The Black Panthers and The Weathermen126 reportedly wanted 
the public to feel.  In 1970, young militants crowded the FBI’s most wanted list.127  
According to the media, making a revolution became a common denominator for many 
radicals. 
 In the early 1970s, newspapers were filled with stories of campus protests, 
particularly against the Vietnam War, that turned towards violence.  The language of 
“terrorism” was used throughout the media examples on the student violence.  For 
example, the heading of a Christian Science Monitor article read: “University vs. 
Terrorism.”128  Riots, vandalism, and terrorism by small groups threatened campuses, and 
the media saw this violence as withholding from the majority its civil right to 
education.129  President Nixon reiterated this assertion, saying that there can be “no 
compromise with lawlessness,” and urged university officials to display some 
“backbone” against campus revolutionaries.130  The bombing at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison in 1970 was reported by the Christian Science Monitor to have 
“knocked the romanticism out of revolution.  A lot of people never realized 
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experimentally what that position meant.”131  The media emphasized the volume of the 
violence, for since the 1970-1971 school year began there had been few mass 
demonstrations or riots, but not a month had passed without a bombing at some American 
college or university.132   
A 19-year old terrorist named Larry spoke candidly to a Newsweek reporter in 
1970.  The article introduced the young man as a terrorist in the sub-heading: “A 19-Year 
Old U.S. Terrorist Tells His Story.”  This interview indicated that the news media were 
trying to understand the young terrorist’s justification for violence.  Many Americans 
could not empathize with the young revolutionaries.  Larry belonged to a 50-member, all-
white, all-male revolutionary terrorist gang.  He explained to reporter Karl Fleming that 
the terrorists “want change now.  And nothing is at our disposal but violence.  We can’t 
even demonstrate without getting clubbed and tear-gassed.  Well, if we can’t live in 
peace, then the rich can’t live in peace.  There will be an all-out war within a year.”133  
The revolutionaries viewed the police, the courts, the government, universities, and the 
military as symbols of American imperialism in Vietnam.  Newsweek printed the story in 
October 1970, and the publication let Larry’s extremist words speak for themselves.  
Especially prominent was the headline: “We’ll Blow Up the World.” 
 The media acknowledged that the Nixon Administration saw violence at home as 
a substantial problem and sought to root it out.  However, as the Washington Post 
reported, and the media knew all too well, “the worst reaction to terrorism is panic; and 
the worst form of panic is indiscriminate repression involving the sacrifice of civil 
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liberty.”134  President Nixon supported police action against terrorists by forming 
government action groups to combat the issue, but to the media he walked the fine line of 
preserving civil liberties.  For Nixon, terrorism was “an international disease, the idea if 
you have a cause, you use any means to bring about that cause, to accomplish it, and that 
the cause justifies the means.”135  Many of the media sources reported on bombings in 
protest of Vietnam, mainly from 1969 to 1972, but by late 1970 there were the 
beginnings “of a wider understanding that morally one cannot in the same breath 
condemn killing in Vietnam and condone the killing of a cop at home.”136  However, the 
National Review reported that in the first four months of 1972 there were 607 bombings 
(10 killed, 56 injured) in the U.S., of which it is estimated that half were “politically 
motivated.”137  Of the large number of bombings that took place in a mere four months, 
only a handful was reported in the American media.  Political violence in the U.S. in the 
early 1970s was largely a product of the extreme left and right, and the media highlighted 
both their dangerous acts and their hypocrisy.  Regardless of the legitimacy of their 
cause, the young radicals did command the attention of the American media and the 
government during a politically charged time in the U.S. 
The overwhelming majority of the articles that mentioned terrorism in the 
Chicago Daily Defender, a large and influential black newspaper, referred to gang 
violence and race relations.  An article went so far as to classify purse snatching from the 
elderly as a tale of terrorism.138  In May, 1969, an article referred to the Ku Klux Klan as 
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“night riding racist terrorists.”139  Another in 1970 reported “a wave of gang terrorism in 
the black community.”140  An interesting advice column by Arletta Claire featured two 
children writing in about their Dad’s radical behaviour.  They said “he carries signs 
saying ‘End Fascist Terrorism in the U.S.’  He’s even professed to be a secret Black 
Panther…we live in a kind of volatile neighbourhood that always threatens to explode at 
any time.  And usually, whenever it does, my father is behind it.”141  Claire answered the 
letter saying “I say ‘Right on!’ to your old man and ‘Get hip!’ to you…Learn from your 
father’s integrity, even when you think his position is wrong.  Buy your mother some 
tranquilizers and help the old man revolutionize the neighbourhood.  ‘All power to the 
people!’”142  In 1970, Renault Robinson reported that “if you ask anyone in the black 
community what is the foremost problem in the community today, they will undoubtedly 
say the problem is what to do about street gangs and the terrorism associated with 
them.”143  The Chicago Daily Defender sympathized with black veterans from Vietnam 
who were especially frustrated with the violence.   
The media reported on the desperation of the black victims of violence.  With this 
anxiety, black people in Homer, Louisiana planned to ask the U.S. courts to help stop the 
“reign of terror against them here and in nearby cities.  They have about exhausted 
possible remedies in the state courts.”144  Chicago community spokesmen also reached 
out, saying that they felt an investigation into the violence must be explored as one major 
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step “toward the elimination of gangsterism in our neighbourhoods which have led to the 
slaughter of our youths our neighbours and friends our policemen and the terrorism 
[sic].”145  In an opinion piece, Renault Robinson lashed out, saying, “the white oriented 
racist Chicago Police Department with its condoned brutality and murder of black people, 
to a large extent, is responsible for much of the violent and hostile conditions in the black 
community.”146  It is clear that the Chicago Daily Defender included race violence in its 
definition of terrorism.  This is very telling of the audience of the paper and its reporters.  
Writing to an African-American population about stories and issues that hit closest to 
them, these reporters classified the product of racial tensions they faced as terrorism.  
Finally, this called into question how far can the definition of terrorism be stretched?  
Were racial tensions considered in a different league of terrorism, or did they strike out at 
innocent victims the same way the PFLP and the IRA did?  According to the Chicago 




 In 1963, then-editor of the Washington Post, Phil Graham, called journalism “the 
first rough draft of history.”    Often journalists do not have the benefit of hindsight or 
perspective; rather, they write stories as they unfold with the resources and research 
available to them at the time.  From 1969-1974, the journalists reporting on terrorism 
around the world wrote within a particular place and time.  It is only now, decades later, 
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that one can analyze the sources within the larger political, social, and cultural context of 
the time.   
The American media serves as a valuable source to determine when terrorism was 
prominent within the various regions.  For a couple of the regions discussed, such as 
Ireland and Africa, the 1970s fell within the timeline of a broader conflict.  Terrorism 
was used in those regions by opposing sides in the fight for independence and freedom.  
For other regions, terrorism was concentrated in Nixon’s first term as president.  In 
Canada, Vietnam, Latin America, and the U.S., terrorism was the result of passing 
political turmoil, and violence was at the hands of those seeking change or revolution.  
The Middle East stands out in this study as the region in which terrorism rose 
substantially throughout the early 1970s.  The media highlighted the implications of the 
violence on American security and foreign policy commitments.  The Munich Olympics 
in 1972 gained unprecedented media coverage and the important consequences of this 
attack on the media and the government is discussed in a subsequent chapter.  After 
Munich, the media revealed the emergence of the Middle East as the primary region of 
terrorist activity because of the global implications associated with terrorism in the area.  
In the post-9/11 era, terrorism has certain connotations and associations in the media that 
were not present in the early 1970s.  Now terrorism in the Middle East is unfortunately 
commonplace, whereas in the early 1970s the conflicts in the Middle East and their 
connection to the U.S. were just beginning.  
 My analysis comprises print media from all over the U.S.  While many of my 
conclusions are drawn from a survey of the sources, there are many variables that one 
must take into consideration when analyzing media sources, as the media outlet that was 
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publishing the information often shaped what got recorded.  For my purposes I used a 
variety of sources to speak for the American media at the time.  However, further studies 
could require more detail to the variables at play.  For example, what was the locale of 
the paper?  What was the ownership of the media outlet?  What was the audience of the 
publication (a left-wing student newspaper or a daily business paper with conservative 
leanings)?  Were the articles reporting, or inserting opinion?  Such factors, as well as the 
framing or the context of an event, play a large part in the analysis of how a particular 
journalist or paper is reporting.   
My survey and analysis only touch the surface of the historical study of terrorism 
and the media.  I have only looked at a specific time period through the lens of a set of 
media sources.  Further work could be done by looking at American television sources or 
international newspapers to see how they conceptualized terrorism in particular places 
within a given period of time.   I have steered clear of discussions on the publicity of 
terrorist acts and how bad acts make good news, but this could also be analyzed with a 
case study on a particular event and the types of media coverage it received.  I limited the 
number of opinion pieces I included in the analysis; however, there are dozens of 
intriguing opinion pieces that speak about the issues regarding terrorism.  The Chicago 
Daily Defender is also just one minority source of many that could be included.  The 
paper was an anomaly amongst my research, but including several race, class, or gender 
related sources would provide for a rich study.  Radical or leftist papers also offer unique 
views that could be contrasted with the mainstream media’s representation, particularly 
of domestic terrorism and the war in Vietnam.  Finally, how did the American 
government conceptualize terrorism?  In the following chapter I examine government 
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documents to gain a more holistic view of how terrorism was conceptualized during the 
early 1970s. 
In my analysis of media sources and how they conceptualized terrorism in the 
early 1970s, it is evident that journalism both leads and reflects social change.  This 
paradox is evident even within the same issue of a particular paper.  The American media 
in the early 1970s were largely in line with America’s political interests at the time, but it 
is difficult to distinguish whether this simply mirrored the times.  Today the atrocities 
committed by American GIs in Vietnam are acknowledged, but this was not a reality for 
journalists reporting at the time.  Often changing societal attitudes can be traced through 
media as some assumptions are not argued or justified or explained, and are thus 
considered “normal” for the time.  Now America recognizes that Israel is not without 
fault or aggression, but in the early 1970s American foreign policy was closely linked to 
and protective of Israeli interests.  In my analysis it is understood that the journalists were 
writing within the context of their time, and this case study must be understood within 
that framework.  Over time, societal attitudes changed and what was once an 
‘international disease’ that could be cured, now seems like a dangerous and inevitable 
















‘Dealing with the Scourge of Terrorism’: How the American Government 
Conceptualized Terrorism between 1969 and 1974 
 
In the early 1970s, the American public was largely concerned with the Vietnam 
War, relations with China, and the looming Cold War with the Soviet Union, yet media 
examples indicate that the public was aware of terrorism in various regions of the world.  
The increased awareness of terrorism, specifically in the Middle East, is mirrored in the 
government documents of the Nixon Administration.  The sources show that from 1969 
to 1970, hijackings to Cuba reached epidemic proportions.  These instances of terrorism 
became no more than an inconvenience to American travellers.  Around the same time, 
the American government faced routine explosions and bomb threats, resulting in few 
deaths at the hands of mainly student protesters against U.S. involvement in the Vietnam 
War.  In Latin America, terrorists kidnapped diplomats of various origins, including 
Americans, throughout the early 1970s.  Hijackings, predominantly in the Middle East by 
the PFLP continued to escalate.  When Arab terrorists killed 11 Israeli athletes at the 
Munich Olympics in September, 1972, the world took notice that terrorism was becoming 
an international problem which was getting increasingly more severe and dangerous.  By 
1973 and 1974, the Nixon Administration and Congress largely linked terrorism to the 
Middle East and singled out “Arab terrorists.”  For the American government, the origin 
and seriousness of the terrorists’ threat gradually changed during the Nixon 
Administration.  In the early years of Nixon’s presidency, the U. S. government viewed 
terrorists as isolated radicals seeking asylum, political ransom or recognition of American 
imperialism in Vietnam.  However, after Munich, and with the increased vulnerability of 
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Jewish Americans, the U.S. began to consider terrorism as a disease rooted in the Middle 
East. 
Contrary to this sequence of events, contemporary terrorism is emphasized as a 
post-1979 phenomenon by most historians.  The scholarship of American counter-
terrorism and foreign relations largely places the beginning of America’s involvement 
with terrorism in the Middle East in 1979, with the Iran hostage crisis.  Some historians 
tend to write teleological, tracing the events of September 11, 2001, back to 1979.  For 
example, Mark Bowden writes that the men and women held hostage in 1979 were the 
first victims of the “war on terror.”1  Similarly, in Taken Hostage, David Farber argues 
that 1979 was America’s first encounter with radical Islam.  Farber believes that the U.S. 
failed to look at the underlying problems in the region, and the government did not 
consider prevention as a strategy with the Middle East.  Although religious motivations 
for terrorists in the Middle East may have been new in 1979, Arab terrorism was on the 
rise almost a decade before, which Farber largely ignores in his analysis. 
The literature on the history of American counter-terrorism provides an historical 
perspective of America’s encounters with terrorism.  Bruce Hoffman uses historical 
examples to address the origins of terrorism and to contrast those origins with our 
contemporary definition of terrorism.  In Inside Terrorism, Hoffman explains that the 
“internationalization” of terrorism occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s; however he 
does not attribute it solely to Palestinian influence and success.2  He attributes this shift to 
a combination of societal malaise and youthful idealism, rebelliousness and anti-
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militarism/anti-imperialism that was rapidly transforming the collective political 
consciousness of countries of Western Europe and North America.3   
In International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations 1945-1976, Robert 
Kumamoto uses three case studies (Palestine, 1945-1948, Algeria, 1954-1962, and the 
Middle East, 1968-1976) to illustrate American foreign policy in regards to terrorism 
within certain times and regions.  He points out that Palestinian terrorism proved to be a 
contentious international issue that embroiled the U.S. in a number of disputes and 
negotiations, most notably at the UN.4  Kumamoto acknowledges that the Nixon 
administration’s multi-lateral approach to combating terrorism may have been ineffectual 
in the long term, but at the time it was the only available course of action, given the 
administration’s concern with other international and domestic problems.5  The three case 
studies used in International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations 1945-1976 
thoroughly explore issues in the Middle East in particular, yet they fail to illustrate the 
changing perceptions of international terrorism coupled with the growth of Arab 
terrorism in early 1970s.   
Dennis Piszkiewicz recognizes that today the word “terrorism” is linked with the 
continual war between the Israelis and the Palestinians.6  In Terrorism’s War with 
America: A History, he says that because the U.S. supported Israel since its inception, it 
should be no surprise that the U.S. and its interests became targets of those who were at 
war with Israel.7  Piszkiewicz admits that Americans had been victims of skyjackings and 
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attacks against Israeli targets, but it was easy to imagine them as uninvolved people 
caught in a cross-fire.  However, that notion became harder to accept in the 1970s as 
American ambassadors to Arab countries and countries with predominately Islamic 
populations became the targets of terrorists.8  Piszkiewicz comes up short of fully 
exploring why and when the shift in America’s focus to Arab terrorists occurred.  
Timothy Naftali provides one of the most thorough analyses of American counter-
terror during the Nixon Administration in his book Blind Spot.  He asserts that the Nixon 
Administration was the first in U.S. history to consider international terrorism a national 
problem, and the U.S. government’s response would grow in intensity over the Nixon 
years.9  Naftali acknowledges the new awareness of the lethality of Palestinian radicalism 
and the possibility of nuclear terrorism; however, he insists that terrorism “remained the 
annoying little gnat that buzzed around the superpower while it was trying to handle truly 
dangerous matters.”10  According to Naftali, although the threat of terrorism increased, 
Nixon’s foreign policy team continued to view terrorism as, at most, a secondary 
problem, as Watergate was about to engulf the Nixon presidency, the U.S. position in 
South Vietnam was collapsing, and fruitful negotiations with the Soviets were 
proceeding.11   
Naftali downplays the priority of violence in the Middle East on Nixon’s foreign 
policy agenda.  This is contradictory to Joan Hoff’s observation that Nixon wanted to 
declare 1973 as the “Year of the Middle East.”12  Although she believes that Nixon 
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waited too long to focus systematically on Middle Eastern problems, because by the fall 
of 1973 he was preoccupied by Watergate and in the early years of his presidency he 
focused on Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union.13  In Nixon and Kissinger, Robert 
Dallek emphasizes Nixon’s interest in the Middle East, as he explains that the region and 
its domestic repercussions were a nightmare from which Nixon saw no likely escape.14  
Middle East difficulties began to test Nixon’s patience and, according to Dallek, 
Kissinger warned Nixon in 1969 that “the situation in the Middle East is now the most 
dangerous we face.”15  Hoff and Dallek focus on Nixon’s foreign policy, not counter-
terrorism, yet both emphasize the importance of the Middle East.  However, linkages 
between counter-terror and the Middle East by both authors are tenuous, if non-existent.  
This presents a conceptual gap in the literature.  The works focused on American 
counter-terrorism underestimate how the American government conceptualized the 
serious threat of Middle East terrorism, particularly in the later years of the Nixon 
Administration.  Bowden and Farber go as far as to say that the “war on terror” really 
began years after Nixon’s presidency ended.  However, Hoff and Dallek assert that the 
Middle East was a prominent foreign policy issue for the Nixon Administration.  These 
inconsistencies beg the questions: How was terrorism conceptualized by the American 
government during the Nixon years?  Was terrorism a serious threat to American national 
security between 1969 and 1974?  Was Middle East terrorism in particular on the rise 
during the Nixon presidency?  To what extent were U.S. officials linking terrorism to the 
Middle East and/or Islam at this time?  How much of our own understanding of terrorism 
is shaped by post-9/11 realities? 
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The following analysis provides an historical study of how the American 
government conceptualized terrorism between January 20, 1969 and August 9, 1974.  
Using government resources I look at the issues and events given the most attention in 
the subject years.  To represent the American government I have drawn from the Public 
Papers of President Nixon, Congressional Records from 1969 to 1974, the Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1969-1976, Department of State Bulletins, and limited 
conversations between Nixon and government officials.  In this study, many of the 
resources had abundant entries on terrorism, yet the lack of information in some sources 
speaks volumes on how terrorism was conceptualized in the early 1970s.16  For example, 
“terrorism” is not listed in the Congressional Record Index for the 91st Congress, 1st 
Session (January 3, 1969 to November 23, 1969), the 91st Congress, 2nd Session (January 
19, 1970 – January 2, 1971), or the 92nd Congress, 1st Session (January 21, 1971 – 
December 17, 1971).  The 92nd Congress, 2nd Session (January 18, 1972 – October 18, 
1972) listed “terrorism,” but directed the reader to “see international.”  The 93rd 
Congress, both 1st and 2nd Sessions listed “terrorism”; however the 2nd session directed 
the reader to “see also crime.”  Similarly, Nixon’s public papers do not list “terrorism” in 
1969 or 1971, but “Hijackings, aircraft” and “Hijackings, airplane” are listed 
respectively.  These index listings are very telling of the American government’s shifting 
perception of terrorism from 1969 to 1974. 
The government documents in the early years of Nixon’s presidency tend to 
separate “hijacking,” “kidnapping,” and “terrorism” as different entities in the indices and 
texts.  This distinction is very telling of the urgency the government attributed to 
hijacking and kidnapping in 1969 and the early 1970s.  Hijackings to Cuba and the 
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Middle East in these years were often referred to as violations of civil aviation safety, 
rather than acts of terrorism.  The government documents referred to the kidnapping of 
diplomats as politically motivated kidnappings. It was not until 1972 that both the 
Congressional Record and the Public Papers of President Nixon included hijacking and 
kidnapping in their reference to terrorism.  However, the Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1969-1976 included hijackings to the Middle East in the U.S. policy towards 
terrorism, yet the U.S.-Cuba hijacking agreement details were not classified as terrorism.  
For my purposes, I look at hijackings, kidnappings, and terrorism together in the early 
years because the rhetoric is combined by 1972.  
Relying on indices when researching presents a number of issues, because it is 
unknown how accurately the listings reflect the content of the documents.  Terrorism is 
widely studied in the post-9/11 era and many scholars have defined it and categorized the 
actions that fall under the heading.  However, in the early 1970s, terrorism was not 
understood to the extent that it is today.  Even when terrorism was brought to the UN in 
1972, the term was not defined.  Consequently, for my purposes, I mainly researched 
government documents that were listed under “terrorism,” as well as other topics 
terrorism listings referred to, such as “crime,” “international terrorism,” “hijacking,” and 
so forth.  However, for the Munich massacre, many of the discussions in Congress were 
found under the headings “Olympic Games,” “Arabs,” and “Israel,” with only a few 
references listed under “terrorism” in the index.  Valuable research is conducted using 
indices, but the historian must be aware of their shortcomings while addressing a 
presently-studied phenomenon in the past. 
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From 1969 to 1972, the American government was predominately concerned with 
hijackings, kidnappings in Latin America, and violent protests at home.  Middle East 
terrorism, particularly by the PFLP, was gaining momentum, but it was not until the 
Munich attack by Black September in 1972 that the documents clearly begin to quote 
government officials as linking terrorism with Arab and Palestinian nationals.  The 
phrase “Arab terrorists” is reiterated throughout the papers and records, especially in 
1973 and 1974.  This signifies that the American government conceptualized terrorism as 
a minor policing problem to be quashed in the early years of Nixon’s presidency, but by 
September 1972, for Nixon, Congress, and foreign policy officials, terrorism became 
synonymous with the Middle East.  Although America had an oil crisis in the 1970s, it is 
only with hindsight that we can make the correlation with the importance of the Middle 
East and America’s growing dependence on oil.  However, with the Munich massacre, 
the increased targeting of Jewish Americans and Middle East diplomats, and the growing 
Arab aggression against Israel, the American government saw Middle East terrorism as 
an international problem and reached out for world condemnation of the atrocities. 
 
1969: Inconvenient Detours  
 When Nixon entered the White House in January, 1969, the hijacking of aircraft 
to Cuba was a growing problem.  In his first five weeks, nine U.S. aircraft and three from 
other countries, all commercial airlines, were taken to Cuba.17  The hijackers were not 
Communists seeking asylum in Havana, rather they were mostly American citizens 
looking for money and freedom when they landed in Cuba.  In the midst of the Cold War, 
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Cuban-American relations were frigid in the 1960s.  Fidel Castro did not initially 
condemn the hijackings and diplomatic talks began only when the landings in Havana 
became a common concern for both Cuba and the U.S.  However, none of the incidents 
had involved the U.S. in a serious international problem.  Washington’s main concern 
was the return of the plane, passengers, and crew to its place of origin.  Furthermore, an 
international code of conduct to this end would ensure that the plane, passengers, and 
crew were safely returned if detained.   
On September 19, 1969, Cuba announced a new anti-hijacking law to deal with 
the situation.  The law provided “for the prosecution or extradition of persons hijacking 
aircraft or ships, or otherwise violating immigration regulations.  Extradition would take 
place, however, only on the basis of reciprocal bilateral treaties that would still preserve 
Havana’s right to offer political asylum.”18  The preamble to the law rejected multilateral 
agreements by agencies such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN, 
and it is heavily laden with anti-U.S. propaganda.19 U.S. Secretary of State, William 
Rogers, followed up on the hijacking law presented by Cuba saying, “It is our belief that 
the return of hijackers from Cuba for prosecution in the United States would be the most 
effective deterrent to future hijackings.”20   
In a September address before the General Assembly of the UN, Nixon declared 
that “by any standards, aircraft hijackings are morally, politically, and legally 
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indefensible.”21  Nixon called upon nations to condemn hijacking and deny asylum to the 
terrorists, and although he did not specifically mention any particular countries, it was 
clear that the U.S. needed Cuba to thwart the inconvenience.  He continued, “This is an 
issue which transcends politics; there is no need for it to become the subject of polemics 
or a focus of political differences.  It involves the interests of every nation, the safety of 
every air passenger, and the integrity of that structure of order on which a world 
community depends.”22  Nixon’s speech did not have a sense of urgency to it, nor did it 
classify the hijackings in 1969 as serious or dangerous for Americans.  Hijackings to 
Cuba were a nuisance that was wrapped up politically in past grievances and Cold War 
tensions. 
 Nixon’s 1969 address to the UN also spoke to the tensions in the Middle East and 
his comments on hijacking were applicable.  He said that recent events “point up anew 
the urgency of a stable peace.”23  In his speech, Nixon specifically referred to the TWA 
flight 840 that members of the PFLP hijacked en route to Athens and landed in Damascus 
in August, 1969.  The Syrian government released all passengers and crew except 
passengers who were citizens of Israeli nationality, which the government detained.  
Charles Butler of the Department of State saw the failure of the Syrian government to 
release all passengers as an encouragement of unlawful interference with civil aviation.24 
According to him, the matter was of the utmost concern of all nations.25  The Syrians held 
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two Israeli men for the release of two Syrian pilots that landed in Israel by mistake.  This 
incident shocked the American government.  Like the hijackings to Cuba, their concern 
was the safe return of the passengers and crew.  With the detention of Israeli passengers, 
Kissinger recommended intensified efforts to gain the release of the two prisoners.  He 
advocated preventing Syria from being elected to the Security Council, and warning other 
governments and international organizations that the U.S. was losing patience and 
seriously considering strong diplomatic sanctions against Syria.26  The detainment of 
Israeli citizens in Damascus concerned U.S. officials and they sought action in concert 
with Israel, yet hijacking, although recognized as a safety issue, was still seen as an 
annoyance in 1969.   
 
1970: The Annoying Little Gnat to be Squashed 
 By 1970, terrorism was on the rise, but it remained a policing issue for 
Washington.  The government largely associated terrorism with revolutionary leftist 
groups that needed to be prosecuted as criminals.  The government documents highlight 
three areas of concern for Washington that year: kidnapping of diplomats in Latin 
America, bombs and disturbances by Americans in protest f Vietnam, and hijackings in 
the Middle East.  By 1970, murder and reprisal had become commonplace in Latin 
America as terrorists robbed banks and diplomats disappeared with increasing frequency.  
The U.S. Ambassador to OAS, Joseph John Jova classified the “brutal murder” of 
diplomats as criminal acts that presented “an anguishing problem, a problem which we 
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recognize has no easy solution.”27  Jova urged the OAS to consider the problem of 
“kidnapping and terrorism.”  The OAS resolution “General Action and Policy of the 
Organization with Regard to Acts of Terrorism and, Especially, the Kidnapping of 
Persons and Extortion in Connection With That Crime” also grammatically separated the 
two acts.  According to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, William 
Macomber, all of the kidnappings that involved foreign officials (including U.S.) had 
been carried out by left-wing extremist dissident groups.28  Macomber said that all of the 
instances seemed to be motivated by three-fold desires: first, to obtain the release of 
political prisoners (often the kidnapper’s comrades), second, to publicize and gain 
sympathy for their cause, and third, to embarrass their government.29  He believed that 
“politically-motivated kidnapping of U.S. officials could occur in virtually any Latin 
American country where there are extremist groups with the above-described motives.”30  
The U.S. position in OAS policy discussions called for a greater emphasis on the 
international aspects of the problem, which included:  
(a) a specific condemnation of terrorist acts (including kidnapping) against 
representatives of foreign states; (b) a recommendation that member states 
facilitate the extradition of terrorists; (c) a provision setting in motion the 
preparation of an international instrument declaring terrorists acts against 
representatives of foreign states to be international crimes; (d) a call on world 
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Executive Secretary of the Department of State, Theodore Eliot, hoped the last suggestion 
might serve as a springboard for future consideration by the UN.  The safety of American 
diplomats was at risk in 1970 in Latin America, but the measures sought by American 
officials largely called on the international community to take notice and heighten 
security.  Americans were not targeted directly because of ideology or origin, but they 
were caught up in the grievances of extremists. 
In 1970, Nixon classified bombings in American cities as terrorism and criminal 
activity.  In March, the administration hoped to bring the crimes under Federal 
jurisdiction, while not displacing State or local authority.  Nixon said the year brought 
“an alarming increase in the number of criminal bombings in the cities of our 
country….Clearly, many of these bombings have been the work of political fanatics, 
many of them young criminals posturing as romantic revolutionaries.”32  In a message to 
Congress, Nixon called for “powers to control the epidemic of terrorist bombings and 
nihilist destruction which has suddenly become a feature of American life.”33  Although 
Nixon expressed the bombings to be the work of terrorists, the destruction was also the 
result of criminal activity that needed to be policed.  The government specified that these 
acts included bombs and fires on campuses and in cities, attacks on school buses, the 
destruction of offices, the seizure and harassment of college officials, the use of force and 
coercion to bar students and teachers from classrooms and even to close down schools.34   
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Nixon’s public addresses were forceful in asserting that violence and terror, such 
as bombs on college campuses, had no place in a free society.  He went so far as to call 
the disturbances “the greatest crisis in the history of American education.”35  To Nixon, 
the problem was criminals upsetting the education system.  However, he declared that the 
bombers were a small minority.  He told a crowd in Kansas City, Missouri that most 
students “want an education.  They may disagree, but they believe, as you believe, in a 
system that provides for a method for peaceful change, there is no cause that justifies 
resort to violence.”36   
For the American government in 1970, the issue of violent student protest and 
bombings in cities was a criminal issue that needed to be cracked down on.  The national 
guard did just that when they shot and killed four student protesters and wounded several 
others at Kent State University in Ohio on May 4.  The students were protesting 
America’s invasion of Cambodia.  The grievances of the protesters were irrelevant to 
Nixon when they resorted to any type of violence, including throwing rocks at armed 
guards as they did at Kent State.  The deaths had lasting effects on campuses throughout 
the country, as students joined in protest against the war in Vietnam.  Groups such as the 
Weather Underground turned militant during this time in the face of what they saw as 
government oppression.  The Weatherman were responsible for a number of bombs that 
rocked American businesses and government targets during the early 1970s.  
Disillusioned with the state of international affairs and their own government, students in 
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1970 turned to protests and some to violence.   Although this sort of terrorism was on the 
rise in 1970, it was no more than a criminal nuisance for Nixon. 
 Also on the rise in 1970 were hijackings, specifically in the Middle East.  
Hijackings to Cuba continued, but were on the decline as the U.S. and Cuba worked on a 
bilateral agreement in the spring of that year.  In September, the State Department 
released a telegram with the details of four hijackings of New York City bound planes by 
the PFLP.  Three of the planes were diverted to Dawson’s Field in Jordan, one plane was 
diverted to Cairo and a fifth hijacking attempt was foiled   At Dawson’s Field, the 
terrorists segregated the crew and passengers and released all but the 56 Jewish 
passengers whom they kept in custody.  Washington sought to arrange rescue for the 
people aboard the flights and during the crisis it became clear that the U.S. was 
vulnerable to attack by Arab nationalists because of its support of Israel.  In reference to 
the hostage situation, Nixon announced that “we [the U.S. government] do not accept the 
proposition that some American citizens shall be treated one way and some will be 
treated another way, because they happen to have been born in another country.”37  He 
continued to say that once people become American citizens, they are entitled to the 
protection of the American Government and they will have it every place in the world.38  
The American government was more concerned with the segregation and danger of the 
hostage situation than the hijackings themselves.   
During the crisis, Nixon announced a program to combat airplane hijacking in 
order to deal with air piracy immediately and effectively.  This program put specially 
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trained, armed U.S. personnel on flights of commercial airlines.  Airlines carrying the 
American flag extended electronic surveillance equipment to all gateway airports.  The 
program planned for new detection and security measures, including the possibility of 
metal and x-ray detectors, as well as the extradition or punishment of hijackers in all 
countries.   Nixon called upon all countries to take joint action to suspend services to 
countries that refused to co-operate in the protection of the lives and property of 
American citizens.39  In September, Nixon was confident that the U.S. could efficiently 
deal with the problem of hijackings.  He declared that the U.S. “can – and we will – deal 
effectively with piracy in the skies today.”40  Although hijackings in the Middle East 
were on the rise from 1969 to 1970, Nixon felt that the possibility of reducing hijackings 
in the future had been substantially increased, because the international community was 
outraged by the incident at Dawson’s Field.41 
 
1971: U.S. Entanglements with the Middle East 
 In 1971, the U.S. was in negotiation for regulations to deal with hijackings to 
Cuba and a convention to prevent and punish acts of terrorism in the form of kidnappings 
and extortion, but the majority of government sources referenced hijackings in the 
Middle East.  Throughout 1971, Washington offered limited sources, as the government 
continued to conceptualize terrorism as hijackings that could be dealt with by enforcing 
international regulations.  In several speeches that year, Nixon made reference to The 
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Hague Convention of February 1970, the 1971 Montreal Convention, and the steps the 
U.S. government was taking to suppress the unlawful seizure of airplanes.  The U.S. was 
forceful about implementing laws in order to constructively deal with the hijackings that 
endangered Americans.  With this, Nixon wanted all countries onboard to deal effectively 
with this “serious global threat to international aviation.  No country or area is immune 
from this threat.”42   
At the beginning of the year, Nixon encouraged countries all over the world to 
“counter the outbreaks of hijacking and kidnapping.”43  In the same address to Congress 
in February, Nixon detailed the government’s involvement in the Middle East.  Terrorism 
was still not necessarily associated in the minds of U.S. officials with the Middle East, 
yet it was clear that by 1971 the Middle East was becoming a prominent fixture in 
American foreign policy.  Nixon stated that “we [the U.S. government] know what our 
vital interests are in the Middle East.  Those interests include friendly and constructive 
relations with all nations in the area.  Other nations know that we are ready to protect 
those vital interests.”44  In 1971, the U.S. government was in the process of dealing with 
hijacking and kidnapping through diplomatic channels, and American foreign policy was 
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1972: International Terrorism at the Olympics  
 The language of the government sources in 1972 present more immediacy when 
they discuss cases of hijacking.  The terminology also included hijacking as an act of 
terrorism.  For example, Nixon declared in March that he hoped to prevent air travel from 
becoming a vehicle for traffic in terrorism.  He continued to say that the U.S. would keep 
its airports, airways, and air travellers safe.45  In the same address, he specified three 
incidents of sabotage and terrorism that were narrowly averted in New York, Las Vegas, 
and Seattle.  With his implementation of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation later that year, Nixon further integrated the two 
terms when he acknowledged that “the problem of sabotage, armed terrorist attacks, and 
other criminal acts against aircraft and air travelers pose an increasingly grave threat to 
civil aviation around the world.”46 
In a Department of State Bulletin, legal advisor John R. Stevenson thought it 
would be counterproductive to try to define terrorism.  Rather, he attempted to identify 
certain categories of offences that should be condemned by all states, regardless of 
ideology or alignment.  These categories included: first, hijacking and sabotage of civil 
aircraft; second, the kidnapping and assassination of foreign diplomats and officials; and 
finally, the export of international terrorism to countries not involved in the conflicts 
which spawned those acts of terrorism.47  Stevenson’s analysis reflected the way the U.S. 
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government conceptualized terrorism in 1972 – including hijacking, kidnapping, and the 
export of terrorism.  
The issue intensified after eight members of a Palestinian terrorist group Black 
September killed 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympic Games in September, 1972.  
The massacre at Munich set off a shock wave throughout the international community.  
Senator Hugh Scott from Pennsylvania declared: “we must continue to express our deep 
concern at the increase of terrorist violence and to insure that every effort is made to 
combat the use of terror by those who would undermine world order.”48  Furthermore, 
Congress passed Resolution 100 which “deplores any act of international terrorism, 
particularly where innocent third parties are utilized to accomplish such acts.”49    
Nixon understood that the world was dealing with international outlaws who were 
unpredictable, and in his opinion the U.S. needed to take extra security measures to 
protect those who might be targets of this kind of activity in the future (namely Israeli 
citizens).50  Following Munich, the American government seized the opportunity to 
mobilize governments worldwide to acknowledge terrorism as an international problem.  
In a telephone conversation between Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, Alexander Haig, 
and Nixon, the President said the U.S. should indicate that they will “break diplomatic 
relations with countries that harbour any sort of guerrillas.  Hell, what do we care about 
Lebanon. [sic]  Think we have to be awfully tough…Any nation that harbours or gives 
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sanctuary to these international outlaws we will cut off economic support.”51  The U.S 
government was outraged by the events at Munich and realized that the international 
community could not stand by without enacting preventive measures for future attacks.  
Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff admitted in a memorandum to 
Kissinger that the hard reality was that there was really very little the U.S., or any major 
power, could do to rectify the situation or make sure that it would not happen again.52  
The U.S. could attempt to focus world moral indignation and press for tighter 
international security measures, but it would remain vulnerable to the dedicated 
extremist.53   
In order to pursue international measures, Kissinger recommended that the U.S. 
go to the UN and see “whether we can get some international rules on harbouring 
guerrillas and so forth.  That is a concrete measure that affects the world.  That’s a 
statesman like thing.”54  During the early 1970s, the best option for the U.S. to thwart the 
threat of terrorism was the implementation of international rules to hold terrorists 
accountable.  After Munich, Kissinger urged Nixon to use the wake of Munich to do 
something concrete in the UN.  Munich also intensified the Arab-Israeli conflict and in 
Nixon’s opinion “this incident blows any chance at [a peace agreement]” and Kissinger 
agreed.55  Instead of going to the Security Council on behalf of Israel, the U.S. took up 
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the issue as an international problem.  According to Nixon, “it will be good to put the 
goddamn UN on the spot.  We want to put them on the spot on this issue, because we 
think we got them by the balls here.”56   
In the wake of the Munich attacks, Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim included a 
debate on terrorism in the 27th Session of the General Assembly.  U.S. Secretary of State, 
William Rogers, strongly encouraged Waldheim’s proposal and believed that the UN 
could perform a great act by recommending measures to protect fundamental freedoms 
against terrorist violence.57  The U.S. circulated a draft convention at the UN which 
intended to “single out acts of political violence which occur both outside the State of 
nationality of the perpetrator and outside the State against which the act is directed.”58  
The convention intended to prevent terrorism and punish terrorists.  To be covered under 
the convention, an act of terrorism must be directed against civilians rather than members 
of the armed forces.  The U.S. representatives to the UN purposely drew up a narrow 
convention in order to exclude civil violence in which a national was acting against his 
own government within his own territory.  Therefore, national liberation movements, 
such as the fight against apartheid in Africa was not considered terrorism.   
The purpose of limiting the acts covered increased the chances for agreement.  
The proposed convention attempted to single out the internationalization of violent acts 
committed abroad, namely Munich, the assassinations of foreign officials, mail bombs, 
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and hijackings.  If the UN implemented a strong resolution, Nixon believed it would 
“further strengthen the hands of all nations in dealing with the scourge of terrorism.”59  
U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett Jr. acknowledged that the draft convention “does 
not seek to define terrorism or to deal with all acts which might be called terrorism.  
Rather, it is a narrowly drawn convention which focuses on the common interest of all 
nations in preventing the spread of violence from areas involved in civil or international 
conflict.”60 
 However, the U.S. was unable to convince the African bloc that action against 
terrorism would not impinge on national liberation movements, because the U.S. 
convention was aimed at targeting recent terrorist acts in the Middle East.  On December 
11, the UN’s Legal Committee approved a resolution sponsored by a group of “non-
aligned” countries that expressed “deep concern over increasing acts of violence which 
endanger or take innocent human lives.”61  According to Rogers, the resolution was 
“disappointingly weak” and “only asks nations to submit proposals for further action to 
the UN Secretary-General by June 1, 1973, and creates an ad hoc committee to study 
them.”62  The resolution reaffirmed the inalienable right to self-determination and urged 
states to devote their immediate attention to finding just and peaceful solutions to the 
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underlying causes which gave rise to acts of violence which endangered or took innocent 
human lives or jeopardized fundamental freedoms.63   
During the debates, the U.S. compromised to the middle ground and supported the 
Italian draft which asked the International Law Commission to draw up a draft 
convention on international terrorism for adoption at the next General Assembly.  The 
weak UN resolution that was approved disappointed American officials and some pointed 
to the ineffectiveness of the UN, since it did not take concrete actions against what was 
undeniably an international problem that was of the utmost concern of all nations.  For 
the U.S., the Munich tragedy provided an opportunity to bring the issue to the UN to get 
international regulations against terrorism which was rampant in the Middle East.  The 
internationalization of terrorism was becoming a growing problem in the Middle East and 
America began to link terrorism to that region in the wake of Munich. 
 On September 25, Nixon announced the establishment of a Cabinet Committee to 
Combat Terrorism,64 to be chaired by Secretary Rogers.  The Committee brought together 
the resources of U.S. agencies to bear effectively on the task of preventing and 
eliminating terrorism.  According to Nixon, the Committee “will consider the most 
effective means by which to prevent terrorism here and abroad, and it will also take the 
lead in establishing procedures to ensure that our government can take appropriate action 
                                                        
63 “Telegram 5526 from the Mission to the United Nations to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization,” New York, December 13, 1972, U.S. Department of State, [Accessed March 2008], 
Available online at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e1/45565.htm 
64 Members of the Committee included: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary 
of Defence, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Transportation, the United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for National Security 
Affairs, the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, the Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and such others that the chairmen considered necessary.  A Working Group was comprised 
of personally designated senior representatives of the members of the Committee.  The committee was 
abolished in 1977 and the National Security Council initiated a study to assess U.S. abilities to combat 
terrorism. 
  76 
in response to acts of terrorism swiftly and effectively.”65  The creation of the committee 
indicated Nixon’s emerging hard line against terrorism at home and abroad.  The 
Committee was formed shortly after Munich, and was Nixon’s domestic reaction to 
increase U.S. action against terrorism.   
Later that month, due to the rise of terrorist activity, Washington announced 
stricter visa requirements for visitors entering the country.  Only native and naturalized 
Canadians, British subjects from Bermuda and Mexican citizens with a valid border-
crossing card were exempt from the restrictions.  In October, the Nixon administration 
acted on a promise to protect Israeli citizens in the U.S. from terrorist attacks, and began 
a major effort to screen Arabs residing in the U.S. suspected of planning terrorism, and to 
screen travellers from Arab nations more carefully.66  The government hoped to pinpoint 
potential terrorists before a threat could be actualized.  Surveillance and interrogation 
operations supposedly targeted members of Black September and other terrorist groups.  
However, Arab Americans were outraged by the implied assumption that they were 
dangerous because of their country of origin.  This measure demonstrated that the 
American government associated the Middle East with terrorism, specifically Arabs.  
Terrorism against Israeli citizens was a serious threat in the eyes of the American 
government in 1972, and the screening of Arabs went so far as to assume Arab guilt 
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1973: The Threat of Middle East Terrorism Hardens 
By 1973, Cuba and the U.S. reached an agreement to thwart hijackings to Havana.  
The parties agreed to give serious consideration to extraditing hijackers, to provide 
continued protection of travellers, to return funds or property obtained illegally, to try, in 
accordance with national laws, any person or group who conducted air piracy, and to hold 
the possibility of granting political asylum in some cases where no financial extortion or 
physical injuries are involved.67  Hijackings to Cuba became far less frequent by 1972, 
and by the time the governments implemented the agreement in 1973, the problem had 
largely subsided. 
 By 1973, aside from sparse references to Cuba and Latin America, the 
overwhelming majority of government sources commented on terrorism in the Middle 
East and specified “Arab terrorists” or “Palestinian terrorists” for the first time in the 
texts.  Armin H. Meyer, special assistant to Secretary of State Rogers, explained that 
what the U.S. government was dealing with was “an upsurge, almost an epidemic.  It 
ranges from the killing of Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich and the murder of two U.S. 
diplomats in Khartoum, on down to skyjackings, kidnappings, and letter bombs.”68  
Meyer commented that it was hard to break down where the most dangerous places in the 
world were, but “obviously the Middle East is one of the hot spots.”69   
 In 1973 “Arab Terrorism” assumed a central place in the rhetoric of the American 
government.  Although kidnappings continued to be a problem in 1973 and letter bombs 
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became another violent tool of terrorists, many of the events commented on by the U.S. 
government referred to Arab terrorists.  For example, the Representative Frank Brasco of 
New York addressed the House of Representatives saying “Arab terrorism set a new 
precedent by foully murdering Josef Alon, an Israeli military attaché, in front of his 
suburban Maryland home.”70  Brasco continued to say that “such murders are blazing 
illustrations of a mentality rife throughout the Arab world.  These terrorists are financed, 
trained, armed, and vocally supported by most Arab governments.  They travel and hide 
because of abuse of diplomatic passports and immunity.”71  According to Nixon, the 
murder of two American diplomats, Ambassador Cleo A. Noel and Deputy Chief of 
Mission George Curtis Moore by Arab terrorists in Khartoum, Sudan underscored, once 
again, the need for all nations to take a firm stand against the menace of international 
terrorism.72   
In December, the Representative Lester Wolff of New York addressed the House 
of Representatives in response to Arab guerrilla massacres of unarmed civilians.  Wolff 
commented that the murders reminded the American government “in the starkest terms 
that elements of the Arab world simply do not believe in the settlement of serious 
international problems by any method other than murder and terror.”73  He also entered 
into the record an editorial from the December 22 edition of the New York Daily News 
that listed a chronology of the long series of Arab terrorism.  According to the editorial, 
1969 lists 10 acts of terror committed by Arabs, 1970 lists nine, 1971 lists two, 1972 lists 
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22, and 1973 lists 23 so far that year.74  It was evident from the chronology that terrorism 
in the Middle East was on the rise from 1969 to 1974. 
 Hijackings in particular were continually linked to the Middle East and Arab 
aggression.  The U.S. government continued to deplore such incidents as the Arab 
terrorist attack at the Leonardo da Vinci Airport in Fiumucino, Italy.  According to 
Nixon, “the perpetrators of such atrocities can only delay the day when peace and justice 
may return to the Middle East.”75  Both the Public Papers of President Nixon and the 
Congressional Records made clear references to “Arab terrorists” in 1973.  A 
Representative from Pennsylvania, Robert Nix, declared that “the indiscriminate 
terrorism by cold-blooded execution and haphazard firing on aircraft in crowded air 
terminals has accomplished only the refreshing of the disgust of the civilized world with 
Arab terrorism.”76  Nix goes so far as to tie Arab terrorists to the oil crisis.  To him, it was 
not only Israel that was threatened by Arab terrorism, but the U.S. and all of the nations 
of the Western World.77  He continued on to say, “it should also be clear the energy crisis 
engineered by Arab governments differs only in kind from the motivations of Palestinian 
guerrillas.”78   
The U.S. government saw the actions of the Arabs as detrimental to the peace 
talks, as a Representative from Kentucky, Romano Mazzoli, pointed out: “the acts of 
brutal terrorism by fanatic Palestinians, the inhumane and illegal actions of Syria 
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regarding POW’s are outrageous, because they are crimes against human nature.”79  
Brasco, a Representative from New York, forcefully declared that “everyone bleeds 
publicly and deplores the sad situation in the Middle East.  No one indicates that the 
terrorists are an establishment subsidized by Arab countries, paid by them, and treated as 
public heroes in their press.”80  The language of Brasco’s strong condemnation of Arab 
terrorism speaks volumes to the way the American government conceptualized terrorism 
in 1973.  At this time terrorism, namely hijackings and kidnappings, was clearly the work 
of Arab terrorists who murdered innocent victims in cold blood and had a vested interest 
in further bloodshed. 
 
1974:  Another ‘Guerilla Action,’ Another Challenge to All Decent Human Instinct 
According to Lewis Hoffacker, Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator 
for Combating Terrorism, hijacking within the U.S. fell significantly since the beginning 
of 1973.  He did not attribute it to luck, but rather to the rigorous airport security program 
and the evolution of a bilateral agreement with Cuba.81  Hoffacker said the American 
government was concerned with terrorism throughout the world, even if Americans were 
not directly involved.  Terrorism was a new global phenomenon to which everyone was 
vulnerable and could not be addressed without global attention.  He explained that the 
U.S. approach to counter-terrorism was based on a principle derived from the U.S. liberal 
heritage, and from the UN Declaration of Human Rights.82  However, Hoffacker said “the 
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violence of international terrorism violates that principle.  The issue is not war.  The issue 
is not the strivings of people to achieve self-determination and independence.”83  Rather 
the issue, according to Secretary Rogers, was “whether the vulnerable lines of 
international communication – the airways and the mail, diplomatic discourse and 
international meetings – can continue without disruption, to bring nations and people 
together.”84  The U.S. was dealing with terrorism all over the world, but by 1974, the 
biggest threat was in the Middle East and the American government frequently used the 
term “Arab terrorists” to describe the perpetrators.   
In the 2nd Session of the 93rd Congress, all but a few of the records listed under 
“terrorism” in the index referred specifically to the Middle East and Arab aggression.  
The Anti-hijacking Act, which made air piracy punishable by the death penalty,85 the 
kidnapping of Patricia Hearst,86 and the murder of Judge Jim Lawless by a letter bomb87 
are all indexed under “crime.”  Hijackings, kidnappings and letter bombs continued to be 
international problems in 1974, but the Congressional Records paid particular attention to 
“Arab terrorism” in reference to the massacre of Israeli schoolchildren by Arab terrorists 
in Maalot, a village in the Western Galilee region of Israel. 
  On May 15, members of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(DFLP) murdered twenty-two innocent Israeli children in Maalot.  The U.S. Congress 
went on record decrying the violence at Maalot with 324 cosponsors in the House for the 
resolution that condemned the brutal terrorist attack and urged Nixon to raise the matter 
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in the UN Security Council.88  The language used in Congress referred to the Arab 
terrorists as “savages,”89 “butchers,”90 “fanatics,”91 “vermin,”92 and “madmen.”93  The 
outrage of the U.S. government in the wake of the attacks was heightened because the 
terrorists targeted innocent children.  A Representative from Pennsylvania, Joshua 
Eilberg, said the Maalot murders were a crime which could only be compared to the 
worst atrocities committed by the Nazis.94  Illinois Representative Paul Findley asserted 
that the tragedy “by Palestinian Arab terrorists must rank among history’s most cold-
blooded and reprehensible crimes.”95  Representative Wolff expressed his disgust when 
he said: “another black mark of shame and outrage was written into the history books this 
morning in the Middle East.  Another ‘guerilla action,’ another challenge to all decent 
human instinct.  What words can react strongly enough to the mass slaughter of the 
schoolchildren of Maalot, Israel?”96  Such strong language in condemnation of the attacks 
and Arab terrorists filled the pages of the Congressional Record.   
The U.S. government was frustrated by Arab governments which repeatedly 
ignored requests to deny refuge to terrorists.  According to Representative Edward Koch, 
the Maalot massacre was “the worst in a series of Arab terrorist assaults, encouraged by 
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countries and effectively sanctioned by the so-called civilized nations of the world.”97  
Congress urged Nixon to take every possible action to force the governments which 
provided havens for terrorists to change their policies.  Norman Lent, Representative 
from New York, reiterated that “there should be no hiding place for these international 
outlaws.  There should be no place to which they can flee after executing such hideous 
plots.  I know of no other way in which such acts of terrorism can be stopped.”98  Not 
only were countries harbouring terrorists, but countries freed many terrorists after they 
committed heinous crimes.  According to Benjamin Gilman, a Representative from New 
York, “of the 150 Arab terrorists arrested in Europe over the past 5 years, only 9 are still 
being held; the remainder having been set free to pursue other hapless victims.”99  The 
underlying problem of nations glorifying terrorism was not new to the U.S.  By 1974, 
Congress grew restless for the U.S. to take action and call upon all nations to deal harshly 
with terrorists and pursue a direct course for peace negotiations, which were continually 
hindered by the terrorist attacks.  Representative Mario Biaggi of New York agreed that 
the most important mission before the U.S. was to work to prevent future terrorist acts.100   
Some Congressmen indicated that the U.S. and the UN were somewhat to blame 
for the Maalot attack.  Representative Benjamin Rosenthal of New York felt that the 
terrorist attack may have happened anyway, “but the guerrillas certainly must have felt 
encouraged when the Security Council late last month censured Israel for its raid on 
terrorist bases in Lebanon but purposely ignored the bloody Palestinian massacre of 
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innocent Israeli civilians at Kiryat Shemona,101 which prompted Israeli action.”102  
According to Rosenthal, the UN, which had done little to hide its strong anti-Israel bias, 
once again gave aid and comfort to Israeli enemies.  The U.S. was guilty because it failed 
to get a reference to the Kiryat Shemona attack inserted in the UN resolution, but instead 
of abstaining on final passage or voting “no,” the U.S. gave its approval.103  Jerome 
Waldie, Representative from California, was weary of the UN’s “seemingly one way 
street of condemnation of Israel and not the brutal slayers of children.”104  The guilt felt 
by the U.S. government, its disappointment with the UN, and the Maalot massacre served 
only to strengthen America’s resolve to support Israel and condemn Arab attacks.   
The Congressional Record from January 1, 1974, to Nixon’s resignation on 
August 9 was very pro-Israel and condemned what it regarded as Arab aggression around 
the world.  The Maalot massacre was a case study that illustrated Congress’ support for 
Israel and strong condemnation of Arab terrorism.  Although U.S. officials continued to 
combat terrorism all over the world, the Maalot massacre and the rising number of 
terrorist attacks in the Middle East at the hands of Arab terrorists led the U.S. to view 
terrorism as synonymous with that region.        
 
Conclusion 
 There was a sense of urgency in the American government to deal with terrorism 
as it became a serious danger that threatened to be exported anywhere in the world.  In 
                                                        
101 A city in Northern Israel that borders Lebanon. 
102 Benjamin S. Rosenthal, “United Nations, United States Must Share Portion of Blame for Maalot 
Attack,” Congressional Record, May 15, 1974, vol.120, part 11, 14955. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Jerome R. Waldie, “A Resolution of Outrage and Condemnation of Maalot Massacre,” Congressional 
Record, May 16, 1974, vol.120, part 11, 15210. 
  85 
1972 the UN failed to effectively deal with terrorism, and the world’s silence proved only 
to encourage the terrorists.  Early in Nixon’s presidency, terrorism was a policing issue 
that would grow into an international problem.  After the Munich Olympics, the 
government documents began linking terrorism with the Middle East, and by 1973 and 
1974 “Arab terrorists” was a common phrase in the House of Representatives.  Now, 
decades later, terrorism is deeply rooted in the Middle East, confirmed by the Iran 
Hostage Crisis in 1979, and more recently brought to America’s shores with the 9/11 
attacks.  However, the problems of today – the grievances, the attacks, and the silence of 
nations harbouring terrorists, mirror the emerging crisis during the Nixon administration. 
 I draw my conclusions from the evidence presented in the U.S. government 
documents themselves, but I only look at a set of documents within a prescribed time 
period to understand how the government conceptualized terrorism.  With that said, 
terrorism in the subject era must be further studied in order to get a more holistic view of 
this complicated and important time.  For example, I only touch on a few examples of 
terrorism in Latin America, specifically kidnappings and hijackings to Cuba, but further 
case studies could be done on terrorism in Latin America to explore the extent of the 
threat nationally and internationally.  Hijacking and international laws dealing with air 
piracy evolved during the early 1970s.  A study on the rhetorical changes and the history 
of hijacking would strengthen our understanding of this terror tactic.  Further research on 
the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism established by Nixon in 1972 would better 
frame U.S. efforts to deal with terrorism.  A study on the committee’s objectives, its 
accomplishments, members, and abolition would be fruitful.  The Public Papers of 
President Nixon refer to terrorism only once in 1974; therefore, a study analyzing 
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Nixon’s priorities during the Watergate crisis and Kissinger’s role during that time would 
clarify the government’s actions.  A comprehensive examination of Nixon’s policy 
towards Israel and how it reflected American policy on terrorism in the Middle East 
would further illuminate the complicated picture of U.S - Middle East relations in the 
early 1970s.  This study also begs the question: to what extent do the comments of 
government officials reflect public concerns?  How far ahead of the American Public 
were members of Congress at this time?  Whether the public took heed to the threats 
posed in the region publicized by the media could be evaluated using available poll data.  
Finally, further analysis of the Munich massacre in the following chapter proves fruitful 
to gain a more specific perspective on the event as a catalyst for the media and the 
government’s shifting perception of terrorism.  The next chapter is a case study on the 
Munich massacre which looks at how both the media and the American government 
conceptualized terrorism at the time of the Munich attack. 
On several occasions, Nixon, members of Congress and government officials 
likened terrorism to a medical illness.  During the early 1970s terrorism was referred to as 
a “cancer,” a “virus,” and a “disease.”  Initially, the U.S. government hoped that terrorism 
could be cured with conventions and agreements.  However, in 1972 and for the next two 
years, terrorism became a deadly ailment.  Since nations often praised instead of 
punished terrorism, the early 1970s spawned a new level of international violence that 
regrettably remains today.  Conventions themselves could not make the world safe from 
terrorism, but the failure of the world community to condemn acts of terror only 
encouraged the perpetual cycle of violence.   
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 Perhaps Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union preoccupied Richard Nixon in the 
1970s, but his Administration and Congress were aware that terrorism was a growing 
problem in countries all over world, including, most importantly, the Middle East.  The 
American government attempted on numerous occasions to rally world opinion around 
the prevention and punishment of terrorist crimes.  Nixon and his advisors took a tough 
line against terrorism by narrowly defining the acts to severely punish the perpetrators.  
However, what was conceptualized as terrorism by the American government was 
praised as acts of heroism by other nations who harboured, funded, and supported 
terrorists.  The U.S. knew of no other way at the time to deal with terrorism other than 
through diplomatic channels, but terrorists were not willing to oblige.  The failure of the 
world community to band together to define and prosecute terrorists in the 1970s would 
haunt the U.S. into the 21st century.  Today, an international agreement on terrorism is 
still as far from being actualized as it was in the fall of 1972, and the situation in the 
Middle East is increasingly volatile.  Even though the civilized consensus condemns 
terrorism today, there are many who still see it as a legitimate tactical weapon which they 
are not prepared to give up by any measure of negotiation or treaty. This recalcitrance can 
be seen as leading us towards the 40th year of the war on terror, a notion which has only 










‘A Tragedy for All the Peoples and Nations of the World’:  
The Munich Olympic Massacre 
 
 The Munich Olympics were supposed to be the “Carefree Games.”  The last 
Olympics on German soil, in 1936, opened and closed with salutes to Hitler.  During the 
1936 Games, Berlin was adorned with swastikas, barbed wire, and armed troops.  
However, the Munich Olympics, which began with the opening ceremony on August 26, 
1972, were meant to showcase a new Germany in which any form of militancy was 
purposefully scarce.  Instead of armed guards at entry gates, security personnel carried 
walkie-talkies.  The relaxed atmosphere of the Olympic Village, where many athletes 
were housed during the Games, was a testament to the lax security measures.  It was 
common for security guards to admit anyone wearing an athletic uniform into the village 
without proper identification.  Athletes also frequently scaled the chain-link fence around 
the perimeter of the grounds after a night out on the town in Munich.  From the night-
time patrol cutbacks, to the pastel-coloured dachshund mascot called “Waldi,” these 
Games were meant to rid the world of its ghastly memory of the militant German past.  
The participation of the Israeli Olympic team was also significant to overcoming the 
former image of German totalitarianism.  Many of the athletes lost relatives in the 
Holocaust, and the memory of this atrocity was still fresh in 1972.  However, the Israeli 
team hoped to show defiance to the Nazi past by participating in the Munich Olympics.      
The sporting jubilee did not go on without a few political issues that are inevitable 
for the inherently politicized Olympic Games.  Days before the opening ceremony, 
Rhodesia was expelled from the Games because of mounting international pressure, 
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specifically from African nations who protested against Rhodesia’s racist regime.  West 
Germany also tried to smooth relations with East Germany for the event.  The teams 
walked separately in the ceremonies, but both competed under the Olympic flag, instead 
of the German flag.  Relations cooled between the two Germanys as the West grew 
fearful of its Eastern counterpart’s athletic strength and ability to win numerous medals at 
the Games.  However, the Games were also off to an exciting start for many athletes, 
including American swimmer Mark Spitz who won a record seventh gold medal in the 
400-meter relay on September 4. 
As Americans celebrated Spitz’s achievements that evening, Israeli athletes 
enjoyed a night out on the town watching Fiddler on the Roof.  Meanwhile, shortly 
before midnight, eight Palestinians gathered at a restaurant in the train station.  They were 
each issued a red track suit and a duffel bag adorned with the Olympic rings.  The bags 
were filled with food, a first-aid kit, ammunition, AK-47 assault rifles, Tokarev pistols, 
and grenades.1  At about 4:10 a.m. on September 5, the Palestinians arrived at the 
perimeter fence of the Olympic village.2  They remained inconspicuous, because their 
track suits and gym bags enabled them to blend in with other athletes returning to the 
grounds.  A few of the Palestinians gained access through credentials as employees of the 
village.  The rest were approached by tipsy Americans returning from the pubs.  The two 
groups helped each other over the fence and soon parted, bidding one another a good 
night.  Unbeknownst to the American athletes, they were helping members of the Black 
September terrorist organization who would go on to storm two apartments used by the 
Israeli team at 31 Connollystrasse.     
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 The terrorists first reached Apartment 1, which housed seven Israeli coaches and 
referees.  The sound of the door awoke wrestling referee Yossef Gutfreund, who stood in 
the hall to see the armed, masked men facing him.  He recognized their intentions early 
and yelled to his sleeping roommates “Guys, run!”3  Gutfreund succeeded in stalling the 
terrorists for mere moments, but this precious time allowed weightlifting coach Tuvia 
Sokolovsky to escape through a rear window.  The terrorists soon overpowered 
Gutfreund, as they entered the apartment and began to herd the Israelis to a second-floor 
bedroom.  Wrestling coach Moshe Weinberg attacked one of the intruders, but a second 
terrorist wounded Weinberg with a shot through his cheek.  Some of the terrorists then 
stayed with their captives while others forced Weinberg to direct them to other 
apartments housing Israelis.  Weinberg led them to Apartment 3, where the terrorists 
captured six wrestlers and weightlifters.4  On the way back to Apartment 1, Weinberg and 
weightlifter Yossef Romano attacked the Palestinians, knocking one unconscious and 
cutting another with a kitchen knife.  Weinberg and Romano were shot fatally, but they 
provided enough of a commotion to allow wrestler Gad Tsobari to escape down a set of 
stairs to the parking garage.  Nine hostages remained alive before the sun began to rise in 
Munich that morning. 
    After several noise complaints and reports of gunfire, police and security forces 
understood the severity of the situation when the terrorists rolled Weinberg’s limp body 
into the street.  Soon the Olympic village became surrounded by police forces, the 
international media, and curious onlookers.  The hostage-takers demanded the release of 
234 Palestinian and non-Arab prisoners held in Israeli jails.  The deadline was 9:00 a.m. 
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for the prisoners to be released and transported to an Arab country.5  If their demands 
were not met, the terrorists would kill a hostage for the world to see on live television 
every hour.  By 11:45 a.m. the Israeli Cabinet decided not to bow to the terrorists’ 
blackmail and allowed German authorities to use their own method to deal with the 
situation.6  Over the course of the day, as negotiations with German officials continued, 
the terrorists postponed their deadline in stages until 9 p.m.7  Each deadline passed with 
intense dread while onlookers held their breaths.  However, each delay served to increase 
the already large Television audience involved in the live drama that brought the 
suspense to life with colour coverage, interviews with weeping friends, and glimpses of 
masked terrorists.8  An estimated 900 million people in at least 100 different countries 
saw the Munich crisis unfold on TV.9     
 The Games continued.  The Israeli hostages sat with their hands and feet bound 
and a number of assault rifles in their faces.  Meanwhile, three thousand fans gathered to 
watch Japan’s volleyball team defeat West Germany.10  Eventually, due to pressure from 
Israel, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) halted the Games at 3:30 p.m.11  Later 
that evening, the terrorists agreed to fly with their hostages from Munich to Cairo.  In 
order to avoid German snipers, the terrorists demanded the transport to be at night by 
buses in the underground entrance of the building.12  Helicopters later transported the 
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eight terrorists and nine hostages to Furstenfeldbruck, a military airbase outside of 
Munich.  German police were determined not to allow the terrorists to leave Munich with 
the hostages, as the Israelis were sure to face certain death if transported to Cairo.  Egypt 
had already denied ensuring the safe return of the hostages.  At Frustenfeldbruck, a few 
of the terrorists got out of the helicopters to inspect the empty planes that awaited them.  
Within minutes, five German sharpshooters opened fire.  German authorities expected 
there to be only five terrorists, so the five German marksmen were outnumbered and a 
gun battle ensued.  Some of the terrorists were hit, while others returned fire.  The Israelis 
sat helplessly tied and blindfolded in the helicopters.13  The exchange lasted until about 
midnight when German authorities decided to storm the helicopters.  When the remaining 
terrorists saw the advance one threw a grenade into one of the helicopters, killing five of 
the Israelis in the explosion.14  Two other terrorists opened fire on the remaining 
helicopter, killing the four remaining hostages.15  In the end, the police captured three of 
the terrorists and killed the other five in the gun battle.   
 An initial report to the press that the hostages had been liberated was a rumour 
that cruelly mutated into mistaken fact.16  Wire services sent the misinformation around 
the world. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, the families of the victims, and Israeli 
newspapers were all presented with the misleading news.  Only later on the morning of 
September 6, the truth was released that all the hostages were dead.  Jim McKay, who 
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covered the Olympics for ABC, reported the grim news: “They are all gone.  It’s over….I 
have nothing else to say.”17  
 The events at Munich shook the U.S. and much of the world to their core.  
Although the U.S. was plagued with hijackings, assassinations, and other forms of 
terrorism, Black September’s actions in Munich made it clear that no international 
gathering was safe.  Before Munich, both the American media and the U.S. government 
conceptualized terrorism as violence committed by extremists in the hopes of political 
gain.  Terrorism took place in countries all over the world, but for the U.S., the murder of 
innocent Israeli athletes on German soil by Palestinian terrorists was the climax in a 
series of terrorist acts committed by Arab extremists.  From 1969 to 1972, the U.S. 
government viewed terrorism as a policing issue more than anything else, but the attack 
at Munich made the U.S. vulnerable because of its support for Israel. There was also an 
overwhelming feeling among nations that athletes of any nationality could be the next 
target.  After Munich, both the media and Washington linked terrorism to the Middle 
East, because the region was a threat to international security.   
This significant event has received much attention from scholars writing as early 
as 1972, and as recently as 2007.  The literature on the killings at Munich is divided into 
several important themes.  First, I will look at a group of scholars which focuses on the 
effect the terrorist actions had on the Olympic Games.  Another set of authors looks at the 
unprecedented media attention that the live drama received.  After Munich, many 
countries, especially the U.S., were apprehensive of Israel’s counter-terrorism in reaction 
to the deaths of their athletes.  Some of the literature is dedicated to Israel’s motivation 
for revenge and the assassinations of Palestinians, mainly in Europe, involved in 
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terrorism against Israel.  The final group of scholars examines Munich’s impact on 
perceptions of terrorism in America in the early 1970s and U.S. - Middle East relations. 
Since Black September chose the Olympics as their setting, the massacre that 
resulted severely impacted the Games.  Some authors writing on Munich focus on a 
chronology of the events as they unfolded, reactions of the athletes, the suspension of the 
Games, how the IOC dealt with the situation, and the lasting effects the murders had on 
the Olympics.  Published in 1972, and dedicated to the murdered Israeli athletes, James 
Coote and John Goodbody’s The Olympics 1972 is a limited examination of the events of 
September 5.  Chapter 1, entitled “Murder in Munich,” by John Goodbody, gives a brief 
timeline of murders.  The chapters that follow address the Games themselves, from 
boxing, to judo, to soccer.  Chapter 14, “Epitaph to Munich,” by James Coote, concludes 
the book with final remarks on the closing ceremonies.  Amid the records and medals 
detailed in the previous chapters, Coote points out that the 1972 Games concluded with 
the flag of Israel at half mast in memory of those sportsmen who would never again enter 
the arena to compete.18  The Olympics of 1972: A Munich Diary is a detailed account of 
the Games written by cultural historian Richard D. Mandell.19  He looks at the 
preparations for the Games, the Games themselves, the hostage situation, and the 
conclusion of the Games.  Mandell was given journalistic accreditation; therefore, his 
diary is an inside look at the Games, but he only briefly examines the killings.  In his 
concluding chapters he is critical in his evaluation of West Germany’s handling of the 
hostage situation.   
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In a Sports Illustrated article, Kenny Moore discusses how athletes responded to 
the terrorism.  “Munich’s Message” highlights various reactions; for example, U.S. 
runners Jon Anderson, Mike Manley, and their roommates held a vigil on their balcony 
while tanks, troops, and emergency vehicles assembled nearby.20   U.S. Judoka, Jimmy 
Pedro, explained that he worked 19 years to get to the Olympics and that of course the 
athletes would go on.21  Moore depicts how several athletes coped with the tense and 
frightening situation and how they dealt with their compassion, nerves, and grief in the 
face of competition.  In The Blood of Israel: The Massacre of the Israeli Athletes, Serge 
Groussard gives a detailed timeline of the events.    He also stresses how unprepared the 
IOC and West German authorities were for such a catastrophe.  He expands on the roots 
and the motives behind the Palestinian cause.  Groussard likens the scene at the Olympic 
village to that of a war, explaining that the Games versus the Connollystrasse terrorists 
were equivalent to civilization against the barbarians.22  Brian Cazeneuve, Alexander 
Wolff, and Don Yaeger provide a detailed account of planning stages, the hostage 
situation, the massacre, and the aftermath in “When the Terror Began,” published in 
Sports Illustrated.  The authors use striking examples to illustrate the ill-preparedness of 
the German police and the sanctity of what was left of the apartment block at 31 
Connollystrasse.  In being so careful to shed any hints of their militant past, Cazeneuve, 
Wolff, and Yaeger suggest that the Munich organizers recalled their past too well, and 
thereby invited a horror of a different sort.23  After the murders there were many 
unknown details in the timeline of September 5 and the days that followed.  This group of 
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authors skilfully clarifies the timelines and they demonstrate how the massacre was 
included in the narrative of Munich. 
Millions of Americans could tune in to live, up to the minute coverage of the 
hostage situation in Munich.  The breaking news was broadcast in colour with vivid 
images of a terrorist in a mask peering out on the balcony of Apartment 1, and German 
police on the roof disguised in sweat suits with rifles perched under their arms.  Among 
the hundreds of millions watching Olympic coverage all over the world, the terrorists 
themselves could view the very same images, for each apartment in the Olympic village 
had a TV set.  With such vast media coverage, several authors have addressed this 
phenomenon in the literature.  In Terrorism’s War with America, Dennis Piszkiewicz 
points out that since the events were carried on TV, the Munich massacre was history’s 
most publicly seen act of political terrorism up to that point.24  Gabriel Weinmann and 
Conrad Winn conclude that media behaviour leads terrorists to choose victims who 
possess very high media profiles, such as the Olympians in Munich.25  According to Gus 
Martin in Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, and Issues, even when a 
terrorist unit fails to complete its mission, intensive media exposure can lead to a 
propaganda victory, such as in Munich where the Palestinian cause was brought into 
people’s living rooms through live TV.26  James W. Hoge argues for the ability of the 
media to stabilize a terrorist situation, like Munich, by acting as a check on the actions of 
both the police and the terrorists.27  Bruce Hoffman explains that despite worldwide 
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condemnation of the terrorists’ actions, it became apparent to the Palestinians that 
Munich was a spectacular publicity coup.28  In Tales of Terror, Bethami A. Dobkin, 
acknowledges that terrorist acts were not limited to Palestinians in the 1970s, yet 
terrorism, with its media coverage in the 1970s, provided the backdrop for the Iran 
hostage crisis that would prompt President Ronald Reagan to launch his crusade against 
international terrorists.29 
The third group of scholars looks specifically at Israel’s revenge as a result of the 
Munich massacre. 30  This body of literature was popularized by Steven Spielberg’s 
movie, Munich.  Released in 2005, Munich is a semi-fictional depiction of the hostage 
situation in Munich and the subsequent assassinations of Palestinians by Mossad31 agents.   
The authors portraying Israel’s revenge begin with an outline of the events at Munich.  
Although these events are not their main focus, this group of authors are important to 
mention because they highlight the outrage felt by Israel and its justification for such 
counter-terrorist acts.  The scholars emphasize the suffering of the athletes and the anger 
felt by Israel.  Lisa Beyer explains that Israel’s planned assassinations were not just to 
punish the perpetrators of Munich, but also to disrupt and deter future terrorist acts.32  
Journalist George Jonas,33 a Jew and supporter of Israel, justifies the acts of revenge, 
explaining that in terms of moral justification, one can distinguish between acts of war 
and war crimes. There are standards, and terrorism is on the wrong side of them, yet 
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31 Mossad is the national intelligence agency of Israel. 
32 Lisa Beyer, “The Myths and Reality of Munich,” TIME (Canadian Edition), Dec 12, 2005, Vol.166, 
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counter-terrorism is not.34  In Striking Back, Aaron J. Klein offers an excellent summary 
of the events in Munich in the first thirteen chapters of his book.  The rest is dedicated to 
the missions undertaken by the Mossad.  In his Epilogue, Klein concludes that Munich 
was the trigger for Israel’s thirst for revenge and punishment, and for many years, 
assassination became a new tool in the war on terror.35 
The last group of scholars is the most influential for this case study.  This 
literature focuses on the impact Munich had on terrorism in the early 1970s, as well as 
America’s stance against terrorism and its relations with the Middle East.  Robert 
Kumamoto explains that Munich led to major changes in American foreign policy, and to 
a new resolve to suppress international terrorism, which the State Department publicly 
conceded was inextricably linked to its Middle East peace initiative.36  Furthermore, in 
International Terrorism and American Foreign Relations 1945-1976, Kumamoto 
includes a statement by Black September in 1973 that referred to “Zionist and American 
imperialism and their agents in the Arab world,” for by that time Israel and the U.S. 
existed as one enemy to Palestinian terrorists.37  In a U.S. News & World Report article, 
Dan Giloff quotes Bruce Hoffman as saying that due to the media coverage of the events, 
Munich was the most consequential terrorist incident in history prior to 9/11.38  Giloff 
goes on to say that while Palestinians were hijacking planes since the late 1960s, those 
strikes were viewed as a Middle East problem, whereas Munich was everyone’s 
problem.39  Terry Martin furthers the comparison to 9/11, as he explains that although the 
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death toll in Munich was a tiny fraction of that in New York and Washington on 9/11, in 
a similar way the Munich massacre permanently altered our definition of conceivable 
evil.40   According to Glenn E. Schweitzer and Carole Dorsch Schweitzer, Munich had a 
lasting effect on Americans because it was a wake-up call for the U.S. government to 
begin shaping more aggressive counter-terrorism policies for implementation at home 
and abroad.41   
In Blind Spot, published in 2005, Timothy Naftali continues this line of thinking 
as he explains that after Munich, “counter-terrorism” and “international terrorism” 
formally entered the Washington political lexicon as the government organized to address 
the problem.42  Furthermore, Naftali points out that the Munich tragedy involved 
domestic implications for the U.S., a test of U.S.-Israeli relations, a new threat to U.S. 
security, and a threat to détente.  According to Naftali, Nixon blamed the Israelis for 
creating conditions that made a terrorist attack in the U.S. possible and he resented how 
the Israelis seemed to use Munich to push their anti-détente agenda in Washington.43  
Joseph H. Campos II furthers this argument in The State and Terrorism: National 
Security and the Mobilization of Power (2007), for he explains that despite the historical 
foundations and applications of the term “terrorism,” it was not until Munich that 
terrorism entered full force into the consciousness of the U.S.44  He qualifies this by 
saying that it was not until the Iranian hostage crisis that the concept of terrorism, 
initiated in the Munich massacre, came to the forefront of America’s consciousness as 
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having specific realities and consequences for Americans.45  Robert Dallek agrees, in his 
book Nixon and Kissinger, also published in 2007, that Munich made Arab-Israeli 
tensions an issue that the American government could not continue to ignore.46   
In “A Cultural History of the War without End,” published in 2002 in The Journal 
of American History, author Melani McAlister speaks of terrorism as a war without an 
end in sight, yet one that the U.S. is pretending has just begun.  McAlister’s argument has 
a unique twist, for she asserts that Palestinian terrorism against Israel in the 1970s had a 
cultural salience far beyond its limited strategic importance.47  She goes on to say that 
Israeli actions in their war against terror mattered in U.S. public culture largely due to 
internal considerations, not the political influence of American Jews, but the legacy of 
Vietnam and fears of U.S. weakness.48  McAlister picks up on the tension around what is 
defined as terrorism and America’s actions in Vietnam that was played out in the media 
in the 1970s. 
All of the above themes combine to provide a vast and rich scholarship on the 
Munich massacre.  However, many important arguments lay the foundation for further 
examination.  For example, was Munich simply a backdrop for the Iran hostage crisis as 
Dobkin asserts, or was it far more than that in the story of terrorism in the 1970s?  
According to Naftali, Munich had serious implications for the U.S., but did the U.S. 
associate Munich with the Middle East conflict, as Naftali points out, or did the U.S. link 
terrorism to the Middle East?  Campos says that Munich initiated America’s 
consciousness of the concept of terrorism; however he does not go so far as to specify 
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what the concept of terrorism was defined as.  He specifies Munich and the Iranian 
hostage crisis in bringing about this heightened awareness, but therefore, is the concept of 
terrorism in the 1970s coming from the Middle East?  Dallek looks at American foreign 
policy, but if one was to link the urgency of the Middle-East conflict he speaks of with 
the Nixon administration’s hard-line against terrorism at the time, is there a connection 
between the two threats?  
  The following case study engages these debates by examining both media and 
government sources.  I look at a variety of American print media, including newspapers 
and periodicals such as the Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, the Los Angeles 
Times, the New York Times, LIFE, The New Yorker, The Nation, U.S. News & World 
Report, TIME, and Newsweek.  I also draw from a number of government sources 
including the Public Papers of President Nixon, Congressional Records in 1972, the 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976, Department of State Bulletins, and 
limited conversations between Nixon and his advisors.  As demonstrated in the previous 
chapters of this study, both the media and the government’s concept of terrorism shifted 
focus towards the Middle East at the time of Munich in September, 1972.  The following 
case study will incorporate both media and government sources in order to demonstrate 
the volume of attention the events at Munich received, the harsh language used in 
condemnation, the outrage felt towards some Middle East countries at the time, as well as 
the call for action against such terrorism, and prevention against future attacks.  
According to the American media and the American government, the Munich attack 
permanently altered America’s definition of conceivable evil, but this evil was based in 
the Middle East.  As evidenced by the language linking terrorism with Arab and 
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Palestinian nationals, the calls for sanctions against countries in the Middle East, the 
threat to American Jews and American diplomats, and America’s security entanglements 
in the Middle East, it is clear that after Munich in September 1972, the American media 
and the government saw terrorism as an international problem rooted in the Middle East. 
 
Munich in the Media 
 Thousands of journalists, sportscasters, cameramen, and reporters filled various 
Olympic venues to cover the events of the 1972 Munich Games.  When Arab terrorists 
drew Israeli blood, the media was front and center and provided unprecedented coverage 
of the events as they unfolded.   Many of the articles in the American print media 
described the security at the Olympic village, the controversy over the continuation of the 
games, the rescue attempt, the misinformation initially presented, the Israeli victims, the 
memorial service, and the unprecedented TV coverage.  In the aftermath of Munich, 
articles addressed the protection of Israelis, the boycotts and continuation of the Games, 
the way the Arabs were received as “martyrs” in Arab countries, Israel’s retaliatory 
strikes at guerrilla bases in Lebanon and Syria, and the new Arab terror of mail bombs.  
However, for the purpose of this case study, I focus on the way the media spoke about the 
terrorists, the blame laid on Arab nations for the attack, the response of the Nixon 
administration, and the effects Munich had on Americans and American foreign policy.  I 
also incorporate comments made in the media linking Munich to Vietnam and the Cold 
War in order to include a broader perspective of the international backdrop of 1972. 
The number of media reports on terrorist attacks by Palestinian nationalists was 
increasing since the late 1960s.  Accordingly, the Los Angeles Times described Munich as 
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the latest in a growing wave of terrorism.49  The terrorist acts listed in the article from 
1968 to the Munich massacre were all major Arab guerrilla attacks.  However, according 
to Terence Smith of the New York Times, the Olympics seemed an unlikely setting for 
Arab aggression, even though Israeli citizens travelling abroad had been attacked by 
Palestinians before.50  After the Olympics, a New York Times article warned that from 
then on there should be no surprises, because “the Arab murderers in Munich have, in 
effect, served formal notice on the world that no international gathering for any purpose 
anywhere is automatically immune from potential attack.”51  Because of this heightened 
sense of danger, Munich changed the way the media thought about security and who it 
considered capable of such acts. 
 The media referred to the members of Black September who carried out the 
Munich massacre as “Arab guerrillas,”52 “Arab terrorists,”53 “Arab gunmen,”54 “Arab 
fanatics,”55 “Arab commandos,”56 “Arab murderers,”57 and “Palestinian Guerrillas.”58  It 
is clear from such language that, without a doubt, the media linked the terrorist attack to 
Arabs or Palestinians.  Black September claimed responsibility for the attack, but the 
repetition of “Arab” in the above terms made it clear that such terrorism was synonymous 
with the Middle East.  A Washington Post article explained that “the moral depravity of 
the Palestinian terrorists at Munich is of a piece with their tactical and political 
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clumsiness.”59  Arthur Daley observed the terrorists through a World War II lens, as he 
commented on the danger the terrorists posed, saying, “there is no stopping fanatics with 
a scorn of death worthy of Kamikaze pilots.”60  The media was in disbelief at the 
barbarity of the attacks, especially since they were featured on the world stage at the 
Olympics. 
 LIFE Magazine called the Munich massacre “the most terrible event in Olympic 
history.”61  The New Yorker began its September 16 article, “Letter From Munich,” with 
a commentary on the Games’ winners and losers and ironically said that on the day of the 
massacre “we all became losers.”62    Many media reports attempted to rationalize why 
Black September chose the Olympics for its attack.  Jim Murray cleverly wrote: “No one 
thought, as this Olympics opened, that Terror would be in Lane 1.”63  One opinion for the 
choice of venue was that “Arab terrorists made it plain that their real target was civilized 
conduct among nations, not merely Israel or the Israeli athletes captured and killed.”64  
What made Munich different from past terrorist incidents was that people felt the 
Olympics were a sacred, peaceful gathering of nations and once that was under attack, all 
nations felt anxious for their own security.  For example, an editorial in The Nation noted 
that the Arabs chose the most outrageously inappropriate time, place, and circumstance 
for their act of violence.65  Repeated throughout the sources is the sense that by 
committing murder at the Olympics, the terrorists struck out against all of humanity, not 
just the Israeli athletes.  The events outraged people all over the world, but also made 
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them feel vulnerable to a similar fate.  The Olympics fostered a sense of togetherness and 
brotherhood, but if athletes from different nations could compete together, they could 
also die together.   
Several news stories articulated the reactions of various heads of government and 
spiritual leaders from all over the world.  According to the Los Angeles Times, countries 
including Britain, Canada, Australia, the Philippines, Poland, and several others, 
condemned the attacks and called “for governments to end diplomatic or economic 
relations with some Arab nations.”66  The media reported that of the leaders of Arab 
nations, only King Hussein of Jordan condemned outright the attack on the Israelis.  The 
media juxtaposed the callousness of the Arab nations with the sympathy of other world 
leaders.  The sheer volume of reports on Munich was a testament to the publicity the 
terrorists gained for their cause.  Many Americans could not rationalize how such a 
horrific attack could take place, especially at the Olympics, but John Cooley from the 
Christian Science Monitor attempted to explain that as irrational as it may seem to 
outsiders, it was the Arab feeling of outside indifference and callousness which drove 
groups such as Black September to go to such murderous lengths to attract attention to 
their cause.67      
There were several reports that illustrated the relationship between Israel and the 
U.S.  Since the attack targeted Israelis, the U.S. became vulnerable due to their 
diplomatic, economic, and political support for Israel.  During the hostage crisis, Black 
September released a statement in Cairo.  The New York Times printed parts of the 
statement, including a section which termed Israel “an American client state” and said it 
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posed a permanent threat to the people of the Middle East.68  After the attack, the media 
reported that Mark Spitz, an American swimmer and Jew, was hurried on a flight to 
London on his way to the U.S. for fears that he too might become a victim.69  Steve 
Evanoff, chief for the U.S. wrestling team, commented to the New York Times that the 
feeling was very tense in the village.  He continued, saying: “A lot of Americans realize 
how closely allied they are with the Israelis and how it could have just as easily been 
them.”70  The media used several interviews with American athletes in order to convey 
their exposure to terrorism to the American public.  The Washington Post printed a 
further example of this with a quote from Dave Wottle, American track and field gold 
medalist.  He said: “As an American, I’m not used to this type of living.  I know it goes 
on in other parts of the world.  But to have this type of conflict at the games is 
disgusting.”71 
The U.S. also felt the effects of Munich at home, especially because of its large 
Jewish population.  Even the stock market was affected by the events in Munich.  On 
September 6, the New York Times reported that the Munich attack took a negative toll on 
U.S. stocks.  Alexander Hammer wrote: “Investors’ concern over the Middle East 
situation was the main depressant in the stock market,” as declines outnumbered 
advances by more than a two-to-one ratio.72  Martin Arnold of the New York Times wrote 
that the New York and American Stock Exchanges stopped all trading at 11 a.m. for a 
one-minute silent prayer.73 Arnold also reported that the mayor of New York City, John 
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Lindsay, set September 7 as an official day of mourning for the city, and several 
memorial services were held.  As well, there were demonstrations by members of the 
Jewish Defence League near the Lebanese, Egyptian, and Soviet missions to the United 
Nations.74  In a commentary on the victims, a New York Times reporter wrote that one of 
the murdered athletes emigrated to Israel from the U.S. in 1970.  David Berger’s body 
was returned to his hometown of Shaker Heights, Ohio in the days after the attack.  This 
brought the tragedy even closer to home for Americans, as TIME Magazine reported that 
all Ohio state flags were at half-mast the week of the tragedy.75 
Only a day after the Israelis were taken hostage, the media reported that terrorists 
received sympathy and praise in Arab nations.  Accordingly, a New York Times article 
protested that the primary responsibility for ending these crimes was that of the Arab 
states.76  Another article explained that the basic guilt was that of the Arab nations, 
except Jordan, who repeatedly gave their approval “either implicitly by silence or 
explicitly by word and action, to the deeds of the ‘Black September’ criminals.”77  
Columnist Tom Wicker pointed out that the trouble was that “it is politically difficult for 
Arab governments to move against Arab guerrillas without calling into question their 
own commitment to the struggle against Israel.”78  He continued that the only thing to be 
done to end Palestinian terrorism “is to find some means of resolving the profound 
conflict that produces it.  Which is to say that the end is hardly in sight.”79  In the 
aftermath of Munich, John Cooley reported that blanket Western accusations against all 
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Arabs for the Munich tragedy appeared to harden opinion in the Arab world in favour of 
the terrorists and against the West.80  The media highlighted the support many Arab 
nations showed for the terrorists.  While this may have given publicity to the Palestinian 
cause, it also brought negative attention to the Arab countries aiding in the violent 
attacks. 
 The Munich massacre surely served the purpose of setting back any prospect for 
an Arab-Israeli peace agreement.  Several media reports highlighted Munich’s 
entanglement in Cold War politics.  Tom Wicker commented in his column that the 
Arab-Israeli controversy reverberated throughout world politics, Soviet-American 
relations in particular, therefore it was a good deal easier to call for something to be done 
than to say what the something should be.81  A piece in the New York Times also 
addressed Cold War politics, saying “the Soviet Union has much to answer for in its 
unwillingness to disassociate itself from the extremist Palestinians.”82  Munich inevitably 
had diplomatic, political, and military consequences for the U.S.  Due to its support for 
Israel and the Soviet Union’s support for Arab nations, the Arab-Israeli conflict was 
slowly drawing the two superpowers to a confrontation.   
An opinion piece by Stephen Rosenfeld compared American involvement in 
Vietnam to the Arab-Israeli conflict.  He said: “To condemn the obvious face of terror in 
Munich is also to continue to blur the less conspicuous face of terror in Vietnam…One 
could hardly say that Mr. Nixon is any less convinced of the justness of his cause than the 
Palestinian guerrillas are of theirs.”83  In his column in the Christian Science Monitor, 
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Charles Yost put it bluntly that “as long as both sides in Vietnam indulge in large-scale 
terror almost daily, it is hard to see how Palestinians, for example, or Israelis for that 
matter, can be persuaded that it is immoral for them to resort to terror in the Middle 
East.”84  At the time of the Munich Olympics, the American government was mainly 
focused on the war in Vietnam and Cold War politics.  Critics of Vietnam were all too 
eager to draw snap comparisons of America’s involvement there to the Palestinians’ fight 
for their homeland.  The media touched on these topics several times, and they indicated 
the broader perspective of American foreign policy entanglements in the early 1970s. 
 The media appropriately expressed disbelief and outrage in the wake of Munich.  
The language used directly placed responsibility for the attacks on the terrorists and Arab 
nations that harboured and aided them.  Due to the extensive media coverage, the public 
became aware of this support, as well as America’s political entanglements, as a result of 
Munich.  Arab countries had blood on their hands after Munich and American citizens 
were at risk.  According to the media, in September, 1972, terrorism was deeply rooted in 
the Middle East.       
 
The American Government and Munich 
 In the aftermath of Munich, Nixon, his advisors, members of the House of 
Representatives, and members of the Senate all used strong words to let the world know 
that America would not stand for such violence committed at the hands of Arab terrorists.  
The sources made it clear that the American government did not classify the perpetrators 
as part of the civilized world; rather they saw the terrorists as uncivilized and barbaric.  
The attack on Munich made the U.S. vulnerable to attacks because of its ties to Israel.  
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Due to this threat, the American government called on the international community to not 
only condemn the attacks, but take action against countries, particularly Arab nations, 
who harboured terrorists.  Like the media reports, several Congressional documents 
referred to Cold War tensions and North Vietnam’s support for Arab guerrillas, which 
reveal the complexity of the international situation.  The U.S. government determined 
that there should be no hiding place for such men who committed the atrocities in 
Munich.  In the fall of 1972, Arab nations were harbouring terrorists and because of the 
threat they posed to international security, the American government coupled the Middle 
East with terrorism.        
 Although terrorism was occurring in other parts of the world, the attack at Munich 
was an unprecedented act of international terrorism.  After Munich, the U.S. began to 
primarily focus on terrorism originating in the Middle East.  In an interview for Israeli 
Television, Joseph J. Sisco, U. S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian 
Affairs, assured reporter Haim Yavin that the U.S. was trying to move on as many fronts 
as possible because terrorism was a worldwide problem, “though many of the more 
recent manifestations emanate from the Middle East.”85  Sisco continued that the problem 
was being dealt with in a delicate political context whether the U.S. was dealing with 
other areas of the world or primarily the Middle East.86   
Munich also etched the Arab-Israeli conflict on the minds of Americans.  
According to Senator Herman Talmadge, Munich “can only inflame the already highly 
incendiary situation in the Middle East.  It not only is a threat to stability in that part of 
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the world, but to peace and unity throughout the rest of the world.”87  He centered out the 
Middle East, saying: “So long as insane and dangerously irrational elements of the Arab 
world are spreading discord and terror, not only in the Middle East but throughout 
Europe as well, there can never be a suitable settlement of differences in this part of the 
world.”88  Talmadge’s words illustrate that the attack at Munich complicated relations in 
the Middle East and had repercussions throughout the world.  According to Hale Boggs, a 
Representative from Louisiana, the particular violence at Munich, because it affected the 
Olympic Games, which attracted international attention, was “brought more forcibly to 
the attention of the American people.”89  Munich made it apparent to Americans that the 
Arab-Israeli conflict was no longer contained within the borders of the Middle East.  
Furthermore, the outrage of American officials made it very clear that the Arab world 
was being held responsible for this and other acts of terrorism leading up to Munich.       
 Nixon described the Munich attack as a “tragic and senseless act” that perverted 
all hopes and aspirations of mankind.90  In a larger sense, Nixon said “it is a tragedy for 
all people and nations of the world.”91  He viewed the terrorists as “international outlaws 
of the worst sort who will stoop to anything in order to accomplish their goals, and who 
are totally unpredictable.”92  Members of Congress described the terrorist attack as “vile 
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and barbaric,”93 “reprehensible and outrageous,”94 “ruthless, irresponsible, 
unforgivable,”95 “Neanderthal behaviour,”96 “the ultimate outrage,”97 a “dastardly act,”98 
a “horrifying tragedy,”99 and “the most complete act of anarchy we have witnessed in our 
history.”100 
Similarly, Congress described the terrorists as “outlaws,”101 “bandits and 
guerrillas,”102 “craven cowards,”103 “maddened fanatics,”104 and “wild, mad dogs which 
endanger everyone and everything in their path.”105  Senator William Proxmire went so 
far as to say that the attack by Arab terrorists was “a flagrant commission of the crime of 
genocide.”106  The government sources referred to the perpetrators as “Arab terrorists”107 
and the root of the problem was the “Arab nations.”  Senator Clifford Case echoed the 
outrage expressed in the government documents when he said: “The heinous conduct of 
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the Palestinian terrorists must be universally condemned.  Their mindless violence ranks 
with history’s most despicable acts.”108  Arab terrorists were the perpetrators of what 
American officials considered one of the most horrific acts in history; therefore, from 
then on the government associated terrorism with the region that bore such criminals. 
 The American government classified the terrorist incident as an attack against the 
civilized world.  In this manner they defined the uncivilized world as the Arab countries 
that supported Black September.  Senator Abraham Ribicoff said that the shocking crime 
in Munich “is more than an outrage against the Olympic Games; it is a direct challenge to 
civilization.”109  Senator Robert Taft Jr. called the Munich attack “an act of unbelievable 
criminality which is an outrage to all civilized people.”110  It is important to point out that 
both Conservatives, such as Taft and Liberals, including Jacob Javits condemned the 
attacks and singled out the Arab perpetrators.  Senator Javits from New York said the 
attack was “piracy against the civilized world.”111  He continued, saying the act was 
“designed to thwart the whole world let alone the small nation of Israel.  We simply 
cannot tolerate it.”112  Senator Javits pointed out that there was greater loss of life at the 
Lod Airport massacre,113 but he insisted that Munich “is a symbol and it involves the 
feelings and outrage of all mankind when mankind is desecrated and when the lives of 
youthful athletes are snuffed out with such dreadful barbarism as demonstrated in this 
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instance.”114  Congress hoped that Munich could be used as the catalyst to act against 
terrorism, for past attacks that resulted in more deaths failed to arouse world outrage.  
The American government not only saw the Arab terrorists as uncivilized, but 
Representative Hamilton Fish likened them to rabid dogs when he said: “Let us act firmly 
and swiftly as we would to prevent a rabies epidemic.  For just as mad dogs cannot be 
permitted to run loose in the streets, these international mad dogs cannot be allowed to 
roam out in the world.”115   
The repercussions of the terrorist attack in Munich were felt deep within the 
American Jewish community.  In a conversation on September 6, Nixon asked Henry 
Kissinger if he knew how the American Jewish community would react to the Munich 
attack.  Nixon replied: “It’s going to be the goddamnedist [sic] thing you’ve ever 
saw…You’ve got the Jewish Defense League raising hell and saying we ought to kill 
every Arab diplomat.  What we have to do is enough here, that we’re showing an 
interest.”116  However, Kissinger warned of the anti-Semitic woes in the U.S., and both 
agreed it was not in the country’s best interests for policy to be run by the radical Jewish 
community.117  In order to avoid the pressure to act, Kissinger suggested that the 
constructive thing to do was to go to the Security Council of the UN not on behalf of the 
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Israelis, but to address terrorism as an international problem.118   Nixon agreed because 
this was something that affected the international community.119  
Members of Congress echoed the Nixon Administration’s call for the UN to take 
action at this important juncture.  Representative Mario Biaggi expressed disappointment 
with the UN’s inaction in the past, which gave a green light to Arab terrorists.  He said 
instead of being too quick to condemn Israel, as done in the past, the UN “should be 
taking a strong stand against Arab intransigence and Arab support for such emissaries of 
violence as are present in Munich.”120  The Nixon Administration and members of 
Congress were sceptical of the UN’s ability to come up with concrete action that could be 
agreed upon by all nations, for it had done little to prevent such acts in the past.   
 Nixon felt that Americans of Israeli background could be at risk of future attacks.  
In a statement to reporters he said, “we will do everything we can to protect our own 
citizens, whatever their background.”121  Senator Abraham from Connecticut feared that 
at the 1976 Olympics in Montreal, it could be members of the American Olympic team, 
the German team, or the Russian team at risk of an attack.122  Munich forced the 
American government to evaluate the safety of its Israeli citizens, as well as the complex 
diplomatic situation presented by the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The American government worried about Israel retaliating after Munich because 
of its political ties to the region.  Nixon thought Israel would be better to play the “injured 
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martyr.”123  His big concern was that he did not want them to go conquer Beirut, but he 
said “I don’t mind them going in and knocking off a few camps, but even that’s bad right 
now.”124  Nixon and Kissinger assumed the Israelis would react, but they did not know to 
what extent.  American officials knew that in order to stifle violent retaliation by Israel, 
the nations of the world had to show support and solidarity with Israel.  Devoted Liberal 
Senator Hubert Humphrey from Minnesota agreed, saying, “the tragedy is not Israel’s 
alone; it is the world’s.”125  His view further illustrates that Munich was a strongly bi-
partisan issue.  The American government had high hopes for the world community to 
use this opportunity to take a stance on terrorism.   
In the late hours of the evening on September 5, Nixon told the President's Deputy 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, Alexander Haig, that he though the U.S. had to be 
awfully tough and cut off all economic support to any nation that harboured or gave 
sanctuary to the “international outlaws.”126  Samuel Hoskinson advised that the U.S. “will 
want to do everything reasonably possible to help avert similar tragedies in the future, but 
should not let our sense of outrage lead us into actions which could jeopardize other 
important interests we have in the Middle East.”127  The Nixon administration had to 
delicately deal with Munich if it had any hopes of eventually fostering a peace 
agreement. 
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 The Senate passed Resolution 358 which expressed “sorrow and alarm at the 
episode, condemned terrorism anywhere in the world and called for the U.S. to join with 
the world in combating the menace by all available means.”128  Members of Congress 
echoed this call for action throughout the Congressional records.  Illinois Senator Charles 
Percy urged responsible Arab leadership to assert itself against the senseless acts of 
terrorism.129  If they refused to yield to reason, he suggested grouping “this type of 
terrorism along with aircraft hijacking and bombing of aircraft, and seek world reprisals 
against such actions that offer safe haven for terrorists of this kind.”130  Senator Percy 
pointed out the need for world action against the type of terrorism Israelis fell victim to at 
the Olympics.  Colorado Senator Gordon Allott shared this sentiment as he called on all 
civilized nations, nations who are members of the UN, “not to grant political asylum to 
criminals and terrorists so that these shameful acts can be stopped.”131   
Such sentiments ran throughout the comments in the House of Representatives as 
well.  Lester Wolff of New York wondered whether the Arab world would evidence in 
this situation some degree of conscience.  He commented that the Arabs “have often in 
the past glorified in the mindless slayings perpetrated by their own terrorists, but surely 
now with the weight of world opinion arrayed against them, they will take steps to call a 
halt to these outrageous acts.”132  Furthermore, the failure of the Arab nations to take 
action would “clearly indicate that they have no sense of decency, no sense of humanity, 
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no respect for peace.”133  In order to stamp out international terrorism, the U.S. turned to 
the Middle East as the cause and as the main part of the solution to this international 
problem.  Benjamin Rosenthal, a Representative from New York, went so far as to say 
that condemnation was no longer a sufficient response if this type of violence was to be 
prevented in the future.  He said: “The unwillingness of the international community to 
respond in a meaningful way to previous incidents of this kind is as responsible for the 
present tragedy as the madness of the assassins themselves.”134  To Rosenthal, the 
international community was guilty of inaction, thus encouraging the events that took 
place at Munich. 
 In order to combat terrorism, the U.S. hoped the Soviet Union would get behind 
their call for action.  Senator Edward Brooke III called for the cooperation of all nations 
of the world – Communist and free – to band together in concerted action against any and 
all terrorists, whatever their professed cause.135  In a statement to the House of 
Representatives, Biaggi, a Representative from New York, highlighted that the Arab 
states, supported by the Soviet Union and the UN, had continued their conspiracy of 
silence and terrorism.136  Dominick Daniels, a Representative from New Jersey, blamed 
the Soviet Union for encouraging anti-Israel feelings and supplying Arabs with men and 
munitions for aggression against Israel.  He saw Soviet support as “the root of the crisis” 
saying “it is time for the Soviet Union to put all pressure upon its client states in the 
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Middle East to end the reign of terror.”137  In the thick of the Cold War, Munich not only 
involved the Middle East, but also the opposing superpowers. 
 In the wake of the Munich attack, North Vietnam released statements applauding 
the terrorist mission.  In his remarks to Congress on September 21, Representative from 
New York, Jack Kemp included a quote from Nhan Dan, the biggest Hanoi printed on 
September 19.  The excerpt read:  
The peoples of the Arab countries and the entire peace and justice-loving 
human race have realized that they must unite in support of the Palestinian 
people’s struggle…Public opinion in the world, and the very acts of 
aggression in the Middle East, have smashed allegations of the U.S. and the 
Israeli pirates who are using the bloody event in Munich to make black and 
white and to sling mud at the just resistance of the Palestinian people.  The 
US-Israeli aggressors are guilty of sabotage of peace.  They have caused all 
the suffering of the nations in the Middle East.  They are terrorists.  As such, 
they must be condemned by the whole mankind.138 
 
This outraged members of Congress.  Kemp explained that any reasonable human being, 
with even a passing commitment to civility or the sanctity of human life “cannot help but 
be struck by the callousness, the maliciousness, and the patent condemnation of innocent 
human suffering by the North Vietnamese.”139  Furthermore, he said: “With an 
appreciation for the North Vietnamese commitment, not only to Palestinian liberation, 
but also to worldwide terrorist tactics, one can better understand why the U.S. 
Government weighs, assesses, and deliberates on North Vietnamese peace overtures with 
such scepticism.”140  In the eyes of the U.S. Government, North Vietnam was even more 
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of a threat because of its endorsement of Arab violence against Israelis.  North Vietnam’s 
support for the Arab cause highlighted its disregard for human life and human rights. 
 Nixon, Government officials, and members of Congress singled Munich out as a 
despicable act that demanded the international community take action.  The American 
government viewed the terrorists as inhumane men who were supported by uncivilized 
Arab nations.  Senator Edward Gurney encapsulated the sentiment when he said: “By 
wantonly killing 11 members of the Israeli Olympic team, eight Arab lunatics have 
shown themselves to be no less barbaric and no more considerate than those who gave 
the orders at places like Dachau.”141  At Dachau, a Nazi concentration camp that was a 
mere 10 miles from Munich, a memorial reads: “Never Again.”  However, Jews were 
again killed on German soil in 1972.  This time eleven athletes were dead, Israelis were 
in danger, the U.S. was vulnerable, and in the eyes of the American government, Arab 
nations were to blame.   
 
The Outcome of the Munich Tragedy 
 Israel was devastated by the Arab terrorist attack on their athletes.  After suffering 
violence at the hands of the Arab nations for decades, Israel no longer trusted the 
international community to appropriately respond to Munich.  To retaliate, Israel 
launched attacks on guerrilla bases in Syria and Lebanon.  As well, Golda Meir and the 
Mossad planned “Operation Wrath of God,” which targeted members of Black September 
responsible for Munich and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).  The mission 
began in the fall of 1972 and continued for over 20 years, as covert Israeli assassination 
                                                        




units killed dozens of Arabs and Palestinians across Europe.  Soon after the 
assassinations began, Arab nations returned the violence with mail bombs directed 
against Israeli diplomats.  Thus, in the Middle East, Munich proved to heighten tensions 
between Arabs and Israelis.   
After Munich, the American media and the American government had high hopes 
that the tragedy would encourage the international community to act and take a stand 
against terrorism.  Nixon and Kissinger pointed out that the best way to do this would be 
to go through the UN, although they doubted the effectiveness of this route.  By the fall 
of 1972, terrorism prompted great emotion with few expectations for concrete action at 
the UN.  Shortly after Munich, Israel retaliated against guerrilla bases in Syria and 
Lebanon, and Syria requested the UN to intervene.  The UN called for an immediate halt 
to military operations in the Middle East, but the U.S. used its veto because it was 
impossible to decipher cause and effect of Israel’s action, and there was no mention of 
the Munich attack in the resolution.  The UN’s partiality towards the Arab nations, as 
seen from the resolution prompted by Syria, irritated the U.S.  
 Secretary General Kurt Waldheim succeeded in his call for international terrorism 
to be added to the agenda of the General Assembly in the fall of 1972.  The hope that the 
international community could combat terrorism was triggered by the events at Munich.  
At the UN, the U.S. put forward a strong proposal calling for prosecution and extradition 
of terrorists to prevent and punish acts of terrorism.  The U.S. proposal narrowly defined 
terrorism and called for concrete action; however, the African bloc feared this impinged 
on liberation movements, and the Arab bloc and the Soviet Union saw this as a pro-Israel 
measure.  After much discussion, the General Assembly’s Legal Committee approved a 
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resolution, sponsored by Algeria and others, that concerned itself with exploring the 
causes of terrorism rather than drawing up international legislation to stem the acts of 
terror.  The U.S. and other Western countries made a concerted effort to bring about 
effective action at the UN, but they were outvoted.  To the U.S., the UN established an 
empty resolution that could not mask or excuse its ineffectiveness at such a pivotal time. 
 Since the UN failed to take concrete action, Nixon was determined to implement 
strong anti-terror measures within the U.S.  In the aftermath of Munich, Nixon put in 
place extra security to protect American citizens, as well as visiting Israelis, from 
possible terrorist attacks.  Nixon and Secretary of State, William Rogers embarked on 
diplomatic efforts with foreign governments to form a collective security system against 
terrorism.  The U.S. government also established a special committee composed of FBI, 
CIA and State Department officials to gather intelligence information on terrorist 
organizations.  On September 25, 1972, Nixon established a Cabinet Committee to 
Combat Terrorism.  Through it, efforts would be made to prevent acts like the murders in 
Munich, and establish preparations for the American government to take swift and 
appropriate action in the event of a terrorist attack.  Due to the threat of terrorism, on 
September 27 the U.S. imposed visa requirements for foreigners in transit through the 
country. Nixon blatantly targeted Arabs as the source of terrorism that threatened the U.S. 
when he announced a major effort to identify and maintain surveillance on Arabs living 
in the U.S. who were suspected of planning terrorism.  In order to suppress terrorist 
activities the U.S. also screened travellers from Arab nations more carefully.   
 Public opinion polls demonstrate that the American public largely supported 
Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially in the later years of Nixon’s presidency, after 
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the Munich attack.  This indicates that Americans viewed Israelis as the victims and 
Arabs as the perpetrators of terrorism.  The question of support for Israel or the Arab 
cause was frequently asked of the public by Gallup from 1967 into the late 1980s.  The 
polls show an increase of support for Israel after the wars in 1967 and 1973.  The results 
from the American Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) poll indicate that in January 
1969, 50% of Americans sympathized with Israel in the Arab-Israeli conflict, while only 
5% sympathized with the Arab nations.  28% of respondents answered “neither” and 17% 
had no opinion.142  In March 1970, public support for Israel dropped to 44% and support 
for Arab nations dipped to 3%.143  By December 1973, support for Israel reached 54%  
(the highest support rate measured from 1967 to 1982), support for Arab Nations also 
rose to 8%, while those answering “neither” totalled 24%, and only 14% had no 
opinion.144   
While American support for Israel increased in the 1970s, so did concern with the 
increase in the frequency of terrorism, especially those acts that involved holding 
hostages.  In December 1977, Louis Harris and Associates Limited conducted an opinion 
poll asking Americans: “How serious a problem do you feel terrorism is in the world, 
where terrorists kidnap businessmen, hijack planes, and commit other violence – very 
serious, only somewhat serious, or hardly serious at all?”  90% of Americans answered 
“very serious,” 9% responded “only somewhat serious,” and 1% said “hardly serious at 
all.”145  Evidently Americans were very concerned with terrorism into the later 1970s, 
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even before the Iranian hostage crisis in 1979.  The poll also asked Americans: “How 
serious do you feel terrorism is here in (own country) – very serious, only somewhat 
serious, or hardly serious at all?”  60% of American felt terrorism in America was very 
serious in 1977, 31% responded only somewhat serious, 7% said hardly serious at all, and 
2% did not know or were not sure.  By 1977 Americans viewed terrorism as a serious 
issue both at home and abroad.  The same poll indicates that 40% of Americans believed 
that professional terrorists were trained by Palestinians in Lebanon.146  Once again, this 
implies that by 1977 Americans associated terrorism with the Middle East and Palestinian 
extremists.  A Louis and Harris poll conducted in June 1978 also shows that 79% of 
Americas were in favour of an airline cutting off service to and from any country which 
allowed terrorists to use that country as a base of training or operations, or which gave 
refuge to terrorists or lets them go free.147  After Munich, both the media and the 
American government pushed for such sanctions, specifically against Arab nations which 
supported terrorists. 
The attack at Munich outraged the Nixon Administration and prompted the U.S. 
to react.  From then on, terrorism was linked to the Middle East, which added the 
complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold War.  After the UN failed to take 
concrete action, the American government took strong measures to prevent further 
attacks, to gather intelligence information on possible terrorists, and to converse with 
foreign governments to bring about an international effort to combat terrorism.  While 
tensions continued to rise in the Middle East, America mobilized against the threat of 
Arab terrorists in the fall of 1972. 
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On the morning of September 6, a memorial service was held for the 11 dead 
Israelis athletes and one German policeman killed at Furstenfeldbruck airport at the hands 
of Arab terrorists.  The Olympic flag flew at half mast, as did the flags of the nations 
participating in the Games.  Even before the ceremony ended there were wild protests 
from Arab officials because of this.  However, the service was broadcast on TV all over 
the world so that hundreds of millions of people could see the colours of Egypt, Syria, 
Algeria, and others lowered to the mourning position.  As well, not one official or athlete 
from any Arab country, the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia or Poland was present at the 
memorial.148  The world watched the memorial assuming that all nations grieved the loss 
of the Israeli athletes.  However, the American media and the American government 
quickly realized that the insincere gestures of the Arab countries spoke volumes to the 
politics surrounding terrorism.   
To the applause of the crowd, Avery Brundage, the president of the IOC, 
announced that the Munich Olympic Games would continue that afternoon.  The Games 
would be remembered for the Soviet Union’s sweep of medals, for the controversy over 
inconsistent judging, for Mark Spitz’s seven gold medals, and for East Germany’s strong 
athletic showing.  Sadly, however, the Munich Games also became synonymous with 
sorrow and tragedy.  The attack outraged leaders and citizens from all over the world, but 
for America, Munich provided an opportunity to promote strong measures to prevent 
future acts of terrorism.  Long before Reagan announced his “War on Terror,” and even 
before Iranian revolutionaries stormed the American embassy in Tehran, the Munich 
attack sparked America’s fight against terrorism rooted in the Middle East.   
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The memorial plaque in front of the Israeli quarters at 31 Connollystrasse lists the 
names of the murdered Israelis and says “Honour to their memory.”  Many hoped that the 
aftermath of the attack would indeed honour the memory of the athletes and serve as a 
catalyst for good will among nations and spur actions to prevent such acts in the future.  
However, it has been over 35 years since that fateful day in September, 1972, and the 
world is still trying to come to grips with violent terrorism that strikes almost daily in 
some part of the world.  Munich made the U.S. aware of the roots of terrorism at the time, 
but the country was little more equipped on September 11, 2001, than it was then to deal 


































 When members of the Sunni-Islamic terrorist movement, Al-Qaeda, hijacked four 
planes on September 11, 2001, our perspective on terrorism changed from anything that 
was familiar before the first plane hit the North Tower shortly before 9:00 that morning.  
Our understanding of terrorism evolved over the decades leading to that day, but in the 
post-9/11 era, terrorism became a new form of evil for America.  Therefore, studies that 
seek to improve our understanding of terrorism have become popular in the wake of this 
shifting awareness.  In order to comprehend terrorism today, we must recognize the 
history of how America conceptualized terrorism.   
 My analysis of the media and the American government’s perception of terrorism 
during the Nixon Administration illustrates that it was during this time that America first 
associated terrorism with the Middle East.  In the early years of Nixon’s presidency, the 
government viewed terrorism as a criminal annoyance that needed to be policed.  For 
example, Americans did not view hijackings of American planes to Cuba, or violent 
student protests, as terrorist threats to security.  However, Munich in 1972 altered the 
American consciousness much in the same increment that 9/11 did.  The U.S. saw 
Munich as a catalyst for mobilizing world action to combat terrorism.  As well, after 
Munich, the rhetoric in Washington and the American media changed, as the records link 
terrorism to the Middle East by specifying “Arab terrorists” or “Palestinian guerrillas.”  
The history of terrorism evolved in the late 1970s and the following decades; however, it 
is essential to note that the root of the problem in the Middle East in the early 1970s was 
America’s support of Israel.  This means that America’s association of terrorism with the 
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Middle East did not begin with the Iranian hostage-taking in 1979, but years earlier 
during the Nixon Administration. 
 I analyze America’s conceptualization of terrorism during a particular period of 
time, yet further studies must be conducted to focus on alternate regions or eras in order 
to gain a more holistic view of how Americans perceived terrorism.  I have established 
that Munich was an important turning point in 1972 and that terrorism continued to be 
linked to the Middle East into 1974, but where does the story of terrorism pick up after 
Nixon’s resignation?  How did America perceive terrorism in the Middle East from 1974 
to 1979 and during the Iranian hostage crisis?  A number of case studies on how various 
presidents viewed terrorism and the actions they took to combat it would greatly add to 
the existing scholarship on terrorism.  Reagan’s anti-terror policies have been rigorously 
studied, but what about the way Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter dealt with the menace of 
terrorism?  As well, how was terrorism conceptualized in the post-World War period?  A 
study on terrorism in the 1950s and 1960s would provide important background 
information to my research.  In Chapter 1, I examine terrorism in several regions during 
Nixon’s Presidency, but more in-depth analyses of terrorism in those regions both before 
and after Nixon would be fruitful.  I focus on America’s perceptions of terrorism, but a 
number of countries could be researched in a similar fashion; for example, Britain, 
Canada, Germany, Israel, and several Arab nations would all make for rewarding studies.  
Finally, how and when did the shift in focus from Arab nationals to Islamic 
fundamentalists take place? 
 The sources in the early 1970s refer to the Arab-Israeli conflict, yet Arabs in 
relation to Islam was not in the minds of policy-makers.  Today we are familiar with 
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terrorism at the hands of Islamic fundamentalists, but the Arab-Israeli conflict over 
territory remains the core issue.  Now Arabs use the Islamic religion as a tool for Arab 
nationalism to mobilize against Israel.  The U.S. became a target of Arab terrorism not 
only because of its support for Israel, but also the country’s successes in technology and 
its perceived failures in some moral social standards angered Islamic fundamentalists.  
By the mid-1980s, political radicalism became reclassified as a religious revival in the 
Middle East aimed at global Islamic unity.  Today experts look at the nature of Islam as 
the source of the problem rather than the root problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
 Aside from the grievances of Arab nationals, there were a number of international 
factors at play during the early 1970s that influenced the media and the government’s 
perception of terrorism at that time.  Cold War politics complicated international affairs 
because the Soviet Union supported the Arab nations.  This became evident when 
resolutions on terrorism were put to votes at the UN in the fall of 1972.  As well, 
terrorism in the Middle East had implications beyond grievances that affected only Israel 
and the Arab nations.  Terrorism in the region ran the risk of drawing the two 
superpowers into a confrontation because of their support for opposing sides in the 
conflict.  Vietnam also complicated the situation because Americans in protest of the war, 
and the government in Hanoi, classified America’s actions in the war as terrorism.   
 The effects of the Cold War and the Vietnam War provided a unique backdrop to 
America’s conceptualization of terrorism in the early 1970s.  Terrorism has evolved over 
the past few decades and America’s perception of terrorism is drastically different now.  
In 1968 the assassination of Robert Kennedy was not considered terrorism, nor was there 
much impact in the fact that his assassin was a fanatic Palestinian.  Imagine the seismic 
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shockwaves we would feel today if a Palestinian assassinated a presidential frontrunner.  
The country would be outraged and the crime would no doubt be deemed as terrorism.  
However, while much has changed since the early 1970s, it is striking how reminiscent 
America’s past dealings with terrorism are of today’s struggles.  After the Munich 
Olympics, for the media and the government, terrorism represented a global conflict of 
the civilized nations versus the uncivilized.  By the end of 1972, airports increased 
security, armed guards traveled on planes, officials investigated Arabs suspected of being 
linked to terrorist organizations, and the world refused to come to a consensus on how to 
define and combat terrorism.  This all sounds very familiar to what we are experiencing 
in the post-9/11 era. However, a great sea change in America’s perception of terrorism 
has occurred. Where for decades terrorist acts were regarded as sporadic criminal 
activities to be guarded against at home, terrorism is now widely viewed as an ongoing 
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